The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law by HSIEH, Pasha L.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law 
3-2011 
The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law 
Pasha L. HSIEH 
Singapore Management University, pashahsieh@smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the Law and Economics 
Commons 
Citation 
HSIEH, Pasha L.. The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law. (2011). Journal of 
International Economic Law. 14, (1), 121-156. Research Collection School Of Law. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1050 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an 
authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, 
please email library@smu.edu.sg. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1763510
THECHINA–TAIWANECFA, GEOPOLITICAL
DIMENSIONSANDWTOLAW
Pasha L. Hsieh*
ABSTRACT
This article examines legal and geopolitical aspects of the China-Taiwan
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). It begins by analyz-
ing areas in which the two governments’ measures contravene rules of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, it provides the first detailed
examination of the significant implications emerging from the ECFA for
cross-straits trade relations and East Asian regionalism. The article also ex-
plains how the ECFA was modeled on free trade agreements (FTAs) of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and assesses the impact of the
ECFA’s early harvest program. Finally, the article discusses the ECFA’s
consistency with WTO requirements for an interim FTA agreement and
potential legal issues arising from the dispute settlement mechanism. In
this respect, the article presents a valuable case study of an FTA.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2010, China and Taiwan signed a landmark trade pact, known
as the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA),
in the Southwest Chinese city of Chongqing.1 The ECFA marks the most
important agreement between these two political rivals since the end of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University School of Law. J.D., LL.M.,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; LL.B., National Chengchi University, Taiwan.
E-mail: pashahsieh@smu.edu.sg. This article benefits from the generous support provided
by the Lee Foundation. I wish to thank Professors Bryan Mercurio, Locknie Hsu, Chun-i
Chen, Zhaojie Li, Lukasz Gruszczynski, Sungjoon Cho, David Morgan, Henry Gao, Eliza
Mik, Julia O’Brien, Christine Y. Chang, participants at the Cross-Straits International Law
Forum at Tsinghua Law School, and officials of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office of the State
Council and Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs for their insights and comments on earlier
drafts of this article. All errors are my own.
1 Lucy Hornby, Taiwan and China Sign Trade Pact, 29 June 2010, Reuters, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/29/us-china-taiwan-signing-idUSTRE65S17Z20100629 (vis-
ited 15 February 2011); Xie Yu and Ma Wei, Cross-Straits Trade Deal to Cut Tariffs, Open
Markets, 30 June 2010, China Daily, available at http://tianjin.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
06/30/content_10037141.htm (visited 10 October 2010). The texts of the ECFA and Annexes
are available at http://tga.mofcom.gov.cn/zt/column/subject/ecfa/subjectii.html?97846377
=3878450466 (simplified Chinese and English texts) and http://www.ecfa.org.tw/RelatedDoc
.aspx (traditional Chinese and English texts) (both visited 10 November 2010).
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Chinese Civil War in 1949 and intends to legally transform the cross-straits
economic link. The ECFA is also significant from the viewpoint of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and in terms of international relations. It not
only serves as the world’s first bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) con-
cluded between WTO members with long-lasting sovereign disputes, but
also accelerates the ‘domino effect’ in East Asian economic integration.2
With a focus on the relevant geopolitical implications and WTO legal
issues, this article examines the ECFA from a holistic perspective. The art-
icle argues that while East Asian regionalism and new cross-straits policies
have provided a major impetus for the ECFA, this agreement will intensify
trade relations across the Taiwan Strait and further ignite regional integra-
tion. Moreover, the ECFA constitutes an interim agreement to a full-fledged
FTA between the signatories and is hence obliged to comply with both sub-
stantive and procedural requirements under WTO law. The article nonethe-
less cautions that due to limited jurisprudence and the lack of consensus on
FTA requirements under WTO law, there remains possibilities for the two
governments to depart from these requirements for their own policy
considerations.
The article proceeds in five parts. Part II explores WTO-inconsistent
measures that China and Taiwan have imposed on each other, as well as
political and economic reasons contributing to such measures. Part III
focuses on the strategic considerations that lie behind China’s and
Taiwan’s FTAs and cross-straits trade policies. It explains how China aims
at expanding its regional influence and ‘rectifying’ WTO-plus commitments
included in its accession to WTO membership, while Taiwan seeks to avoid
diplomatic and trade marginalization. Part IV analyzes the ECFA’s key pro-
visions and pertinent WTO legal issues. It addresses why China and Taiwan
decided to follow the ‘framework agreement’ model that the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) developed for its external FTAs and
examines whether the ECFA’s ‘cross-straits characteristics’ are consistent
with WTO rules. Other crucial elements for prospective cross-straits eco-
nomic integration, including the ECFA’s early harvest program (EHP) and
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), will also be discussed, along with
legal and policy recommendations. Part V concludes by outlining the
ECFA’s significance for cross-straits relations and for the broader multilat-
eral trading system.
2 In the regionalism context, the domino effect refers to a fear of exclusion from major markets
due to certain countries’ signing of free trade agreements (FTAs) with such agreements tend-
ing to lead other countries to conclude FTAs of their own. Richard Baldwin, A Domino Theory
of Regionalism, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 4465, at 1–5 (1993); Peter
Lloyd, ‘New Bilateralism in the Asia-Pacific’, in Peter Lloyd and Chris Milner (eds), The World
Economy: Global Trade Policy 2002 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), at 88–9.
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II. THE TAIWAN STRAIT AS A WTO-INCONSISTENT AREA
For nearly two decades following the Chinese Civil War, the political ani-
mosity between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Mainland China
and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan prevented the two sides from
developing normal trade relations. Nonetheless, trade volume across the
Taiwan Strait has grown rapidly since the 1980s. The main change occurred
as a result of China’s attempt to attract Taiwanese investments, and Taiwan
gradually liberalized restrictions on trade with China.3 Bilateral economic
ties accelerated after China and Taiwan joined the WTO in 2001 and
2002, respectively.4 From 2002 to 2009, cross-straits trade soared from
US$395 billion to $865.9 billion.5 Despite diametrically opposed sovereign
claims, China and Taiwan have become important trading partners. In fact,
China is now Taiwan’s number one trade partner, and Taiwan is China’s
fifth largest trade partner.6 Not only does 70.5% of Taiwanese capital out-
flows to the Mainland make Taiwan China’s second largest source of foreign
direct investments (FDI), but Taiwan also runs the largest trade surplus with
China.7 ‘Chaiwan’, a newly coined term that has emerged in Asian produc-
tion networks, refers to products that are ‘made by Taiwan, but made in
China’.8 Notwithstanding their WTO membership and extensive economic
interdependence, both governments have imposed WTO-inconsistent
3 For a historical background of cross-straits trade relations, see Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘III.C.14
China-Taiwan Trade Relations: Implications of the WTO and Asian Regionalism’, in Paul
Davidson (ed), Trading Arrangements in the Pacific Rim: ASEAN and APEC (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), at 2–3.
4 The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO, which took place in Doha, approved both
China’s and Taiwan’s WTO memberships in 2001. Taiwan’s membership became effective in
January 2002 following the deposit of its instrument of acceptance with the WTO
Director-General.
5 Bureau of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Liang An Mao Yi Zong Zhi Nian
Cheng Zhang [Annual growth of the Total Cross-Straits Trade Volume], Liang An Jing Ji He
Zuo Xie Yi Xian Jie Duan Xie Shang Cheng Guo [Results of Current ECFA Negotiations], Jiao
Liu [Exchange], No. 111 (2010), at 13 (in Chinese).
6 Table 7: China’s Top Trade Partners 2009 ($ billion), US–China Trade Statistics and China’s
World Trade Statistics, available at http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (visited 26
August 2010); Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement: Policy
Explanation, Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan (2009), at 4.
7 Trade Policy Review Report by Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu, WT/TPR/G/232 (31 May 2010) (Taiwan Trade Policy Review Report (2010)), at 38;
China’s Absorption of FDI in the First 7 Months of 2010, MOFCOM, 22 August 2010,
available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/foreigninvestment/201008/20100
807095675.html (visited 10 September 2010); 2009: Zhong Hua Min Guo Dui Wai Mao Yi
Fa Zhan Gai Kuang [Summary of 2009 Republic of China (ROC) External Trade], available at
http://cweb.trade.gov.tw/kmi.asp?xdurl=kmif.asp&cat=CAT319 (in Chinese) (visited August
27, 2010), at 26–27.
8 Many technology products that are ‘made in China’ are produced by factories owned
by Taiwanese companies. E.g., Rhee So-eui and Baker Li, ‘Chaiwan’ Set to Reshape Asia’s
Tech Landscape, 21 July 2009, Reuters, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE56K1J820090721 (visited 20 July 2010). ‘Chi Wan’ is also used to refer to the
same phenomenon.
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measures in cross-straits trade relations. To understand the ECFA’s signifi-
cance on developments across the Taiwan Strait, it is necessary to examine
the political and economic considerations behind these measures.
A. China’s trade measures concerning Taiwan
Even after Taiwan acceded to the WTO, Beijing declined to consider
Taiwan’s status as a ‘separate customs territory’ on par with China’s ‘full’
WTO membership as a sovereign state.9 The PRC’s position is contrary to
WTO law because Article XII of the WTO Agreement stipulates that WTO
membership is open to both states and separate customs territories.10
Although no WTO provision distinguishes between WTO members’ rights
and obligations based on the two categories of membership, Beijing’s polit-
ical mindset led to various WTO-inconsistent policies concerning Taiwan.
These policies include both discriminatory and preferential measures.
First, China denies Taiwanese nationals’ ‘right of priority’ under the WTO
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement). In general, after a manufacturer files its patent or trademark
application in one country, it may well file applications in other countries to
extend legal protection in those countries as well. This right of priority,
which was first introduced into the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (Paris Convention), allows subsequent applications to be
treated as if they were filed on the date of the first application.11 This con-
cept efficiently protects intellectual property (IP) holders’ legal interests and
has been incorporated into the domestic laws of parties to the Paris
Convention. The PRC is no exception, as both Chinese Patent Law and
Trademark Law recognize the right of priority.12 However, Chinese IP
9 See Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘Facing China: Taiwan’s Status as a Separate Customs Territory in the
World Trade Organization’, 39 (6) Journal of World Trade 1195 (2005), at 1199–203 (ex-
plaining Taiwan’s status in the WTO). For Taiwan’s status in international law, see Pasha L.
Hsieh, ‘An Unrecognized State in Foreign and International Courts: The Case of the
Republic of China on Taiwan’, 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 765 (2007), at
770–73.
10 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement),
art. XII.1 (‘Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement . . . .’) (emphasis added).
11 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), Articles 4.A.1
and 4.B.
12 See People’s Republic of China (PRC) Patent Law, art. 29 (‘Where, within twelve months
from the date on which any applicant first filed in a foreign country an application for a
patent for invention or utility model, . . . he or it may, in accordance with . . . any international
treaty to which both countries are party, . . . enjoy a right of priority’); PRC Trademark Law,
Article 24 (‘Any applicant for the registration of a trademark who files an application for
registration of the same trademark for identical goods in China within six months from the
date of filing the first application for the trademark registration overseas may enjoy the right of
priority . . . according to the international treaty to which both countries are parties . . . ’) (em-
phases added).
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government agencies have refused to accept Taiwanese nationals’ right of
priority applications because the Paris Convention is a United Nations
Treaty that governs ‘state-to-state’ relations inapplicable to Taiwan.13
Taiwan’s lack of member status in the Paris Convention, as well as the ab-
sence of bilateral arrangement with China, prevents Chinese IP authorities
from handling Taiwanese applications. This practice contravenes WTO law
because Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement specifically requires WTO mem-
bers to comply with Article 4 of the Paris Convention.14 In Taiwan’s case,
the lack of membership in the Paris Convention due to its political status
should pose no obstacle for its nationals to enjoy the right of priority. Thus,
China’s denial of such right infringes the TRIPS Agreement.
Second, China’s failure to enact implementing statutes for its WTO ser-
vices commitments precludes Taiwanese professionals from benefiting from
rights extended under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). This issue arises from Taiwan’s unique status in Chinese law, ef-
fectively placing Taiwan in legal limbo. More specifically, since Taiwan is not
considered a ‘foreign country’, most statutes that implement China’s services
commitments for ‘foreigners’ do not directly apply to Taiwan. Legal services
illustrate this problem. In its schedule of specific commitments under the
GATS, China has opened the legal services market to foreign law firms by
allowing them to establish representative offices in China.15 To put this
commitment into effect, the PRC State Council promulgated the
Regulations on Administration of Foreign Law Firms’ Representative
Offices in China.16 As of 2009, the government has granted 188 foreign
law firms the right to operate representative offices.17 Yet, these statutes
do not apply to law firms based in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, all of
whom are WTO members. As these three areas are considered Chinese
13 Hung-Ming Tsai, Hou ECFA Shi Shai De Zin Tiao Zhan [New Challenges in the Post-ECFA
Era], 30 June 2010, Zhong Guo Shi Bao [China Times], at A16 (in Chinese); see also, Yu-Lan
Kuo, International Report - Special Notes on Taiwan Patent Prosecution, 1 January 2007, IAM,
available at http://www.iam-magazine.com/reports/Detail.aspx?g=24d9d724-136b-4284-869-
d-1d4f6d0eb380 (‘China and Taiwan do not admit priority right for each others’ patent
application . . . . [A]n applicant that files a patent application in Taiwan is unable to claim
priority based on his Taiwan’s patent application when he subsequently files the correspond-
ing application in China, and vi[c]e versa’) (visited 10 August 2010).
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),
Article 2.1 (‘ . . . Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12 and Article 19 of the
Paris Convention (1967)’).
15 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China: Addendum, S Schedule CLII – The
People’s Republic of China, Part II –Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services List of
Article II MFN Exemptions (Taiwan WTO Services Schedule), WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2, 1
October 2001, II.A.a: Legal Services.
16 The Regulations on Administration of Foreign Law Firms’ Representative Offices in China
became effective in 2002 [Foreign Law Firms Regulations]. The text is available at http://
www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-08/24/content_25816.htm (visited 10 October 2010).
17 PRC Ministry of Justice Notice, No. 91 (2009), available at http://www.legalinfo.gov
.cn/index/content/2009-12/24/content_2010149.htm?node=7864 (visited 10 October 2010).
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territories, statutes that govern ‘foreign’ law firms do not accord them the
same rights. Under China’s Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements
(CEPAs) with Hong Kong and Macau, the PRC State Council subsequently
enacted separate rules to allow Hong Kong and Macau-based firms to es-
tablish representative offices in China.18 Taiwanese law firms, however, lack
a legal basis for setting up offices because China failed to promulgate such
rules for them.19 For similar reasons, Taiwanese companies have not been
able to expand professional services, such as accounting and auditing ser-
vices, in the Chinese market. Consequently, China’s practice not only im-
pairs Taiwanese service providers’ business interests, but also curtails
Taiwan’s rights under the GATS.
Third, Taiwanese exporters have encountered unique non-tariff barriers
for products sold to China, mostly in the form of technical and standards
requirements. For instance, local PRC customs authorities have postponed
clearance or even returned imported goods marked with ‘Republic of China’
or ‘Taiwan’ labels.20 This practice, which has no legal basis in Chinese law,
compels Taiwanese exporters to incur additional expense by revising their
products’ ‘Made in Taiwan’ labels, which are accepted by all other WTO
members. This labeling requirement arguably violates the WTO Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) since it creates ‘unneces-
sary obstacles’ to cross-straits trade and may not be justified under the nar-
rowly construed ‘national security’ exception.21
18 Regulations on Administration of Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions
Law Firms’ Representative Offices in China. The text is available at http://www.chinabaike
.com/law/zy/bw/gw/sfb/1345916.html (in Chinese) (visited 10 October 2010).
19 To bypass the law, some Taiwanese law firms, such as Lee and Li and Tsai Lee, Tsai and
Partners, set-up ‘consulting firms’ in Beijing and Shanghai to deal with cross-straits legal
issues, but their scope of business is restricted compared to that of representative offices.
In 1994 and 2009, China allowed Taiwanese to sit for the bar exam. Chih-Chao Tseng, You
Dai Lu Kai Fang Lu Shi Kan Liang An Si Fa He Zuo [Cross-Straits Judicial Cooperation and
China’s Opening of the Legal Market], 9 January 2009, NPF Backgrounder, No. 098-002,
available at http://www.npf.org.tw/post/3/5263 (in Chinese) (visited 12 October 2010).
Although 40 Taiwanese passed the bar exam, they often find it difficult to qualify to
become a practicing lawyer because only a few Chinese firms provide them with the required
one-year internship. Id.; PRC Lawyers Law, art. 5.
20 These customs authorities require that the labels be changed to ‘China Taiwan’ or ‘China
Taipei’. Zhong Guo Yao Xie Tai Shang, Na Cheng Wei Zho Wen Zhang/Hao Pin Lai Zi ‘Taiwan’,
Zhong Guo Bu Zhun Bao Guan [China Threatens Taiwanese Businessmen. Titles Matter:
China Does Not Allow Products from ‘Taiwan’ to Clear Customs], 23 May 2010, Zi You
Shi Bao [Liberty Times], available at http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2010/new/may/23/today-
t3.htm (in Chinese) (visited 20 June 2010); see also, FEDEX Notice about Chinese Ban on
Made in ROC Imports Stirs Internet, 18 May 2010, Examiner.Com, available at http://www.
examiner.com/taiwan-policy-in-national/fedex-notice-about-chinese-ban-on-made-roc-
imports-stirs-internet (‘FEDEX issued a notice on items banned from import into China.
Along on the list with counterfeit money, narcotics, dangerous viruses, and toxic chemicals
are trade goods from Taiwan that have a Made in ROC label’) (visited 10 August 2010).
21 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), Article 2.2.
126 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL)
Finally, in addition to the above-mentioned discriminatory measures,
China’s policies that accord Taiwan preferential treatment also contravene
WTO law. During the economic reform era, China granted Taiwanese in-
vestors preferential treatment in order to attract capital. This treatment is
dubbed a ‘super national treatment’ because it encompasses tax preferences
to which Chinese enterprises are not entitled. China has gradually removed
such preferential treatment during its transition period following WTO ac-
cession because it is inconsistent with the national treatment principle under
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs
Agreement).22 However, to buttress its recent policy to ‘buy the hearts of
Taiwan compatriots’, Beijing has adopted measures that are incompatible
with WTO rules. The most renowned measure is its ‘fruit diplomacy’.
Immediately after passing the 2005 Anti-Secession Law that authorizes
‘non-peaceful means’ to prevent Taiwanese independence, Beijing granted
zero-tariff status to 15 Taiwanese fruit items.23 The political motivation
behind this was conspicuous. Chinese leadership intended to ease Taiwan’s
fierce protests against the Law, particularly given that most fruit farmers in
Southern Taiwan are faithful supporters of the pro-independence
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In fact, the zero-tariff treatment’s
benefits were limited since it excluded bananas and mangos, Taiwan’s top
two export fruits, and because the profit margin was undermined by trans-
portation costs and a 17% value-added tax.24 Nevertheless, because this
tariff treatment was not granted to other WTO members, this ‘fruit diplo-
macy’ violated the most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).25
B. Taiwan’s trade measures concerning China
Compared to their Chinese counterparts, Taiwan’s WTO-inconsistent meas-
ures are far more egregious. Taiwan’s measures primarily have caused imbal-
anced trade, having made China’s trade deficit with the island grow rapidly
from US$204.5 billion in 2000 to $652.1 billion in 2009.26 The ECFA may
22 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement), Article 2.
23 PRC Anti-Secession Law, Article 8; Position Paper on Taiwan’s Fruit Exports to China, 26
January 2010, available at http://www.taiwan.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=13559&ctNode=1938
&mp=1001 (visited 10 March 2010). For details on the Anti-Secession Law, see Pasha L.
Hsieh, ‘The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with Renewed
Momentum’, 84 (3) Die Fridens-Warte: Journal of International Peace and Organization 59
(2010), at 68–9.
24 Hsiao-ching Chang, Political Manipulation of Taiwan’s Agricultural Trade, 1 February 2007,
available at http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.144/pub_detail.asp (visited 10
October 2010).
25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Article I.
26 Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, Ministry of Commerce of the
People’s Republic of China, Liang An Mao Yi Tong Ji Biao (2000 Nian–2009 Nian)
[Statistics of Cross-Straits Trade (2000–2009)], 20 May 2010, available at
China–Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law 127
prompt Taipei to remove or reduce these measures and pave the way for
future ‘normal’ trade relations with China. To understand the ECFA’s
impact on Taiwan’s cross-straits policy, its discriminatory trade measures
against China must be ascertained.
First, Taiwan maintains overall restrictions on Chinese exports to which no
other WTO members are subject. Taiwan has only marginally liberalized
these restrictions after China criticized them as being WTO-inconsistent
during Taiwan’s 2006 WTO Trade Policy Review.27 As of March 2010,
Taiwan still bans the importation of 865 agricultural products and 1,377
industrial products from China on security and commercial grounds.28
The comprehensive import ban contravenes Articles I (MFN treatment)
and XI (quantitative restrictions) of the GATT because Taiwan did not
invoke the non-application clause concerning China in the WTO accession
process. Neither can the ban be justified by exceptions under Article XX of
the GATT.29
Second, Taiwan currently declines to recognize academic degrees con-
ferred by Chinese universities because the Ministry of Education seeks to
prevent Taiwanese students from studying in China.30 The underlying reason
for this policy is that Taiwan’s dwindling birthrate, which has made more
than a third of 164 local universities face difficulties in recruiting students.31
This policy has had a discriminatory impact on Chinese professionals be-
cause they are ineligible for Taiwan’s professional examinations that require a
bachelor’s degree in a relevant discipline.32 Some may argue that Taiwan’s
policy on Chinese degrees does not violate WTO law, given that Article VII
http://tga.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jingmaotongji/redht/201005/20100506924293.html?
3917983081=3878450466 (in Chinese) (visited 20 August 2010).
27 Allen Hsu, Taiwan Delegates Clarify Positions at WTO Trade Policy Review in Geneva, 30 June
2006, available at http://taiwanauj.nat.gov.tw/fp.asp?xItem=21931&ctNode=122 (visited 1
July 2010). See generally, Chen-huan Hsiao, ‘Taiwan’s First Trade Policy Review in the
World Trade Organization (June 20 and 22, 2006)’, 24 Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of
International Law and Affairs (2006), at 185–95.
28 Taiwan and China to Start Substantive Talk on ECFA this Month, 1 March 2010, Taiwan
Economic News, available at http://www.cens.com/cens/html/en/news/news_inner_31284.html
(visited 10 October 2010).
29 GATT, Article XXXV and WTO Agreement, Article XII; GATT, Article XX.
30 Despite Taiwan’s policy, the number of Taiwanese students who study in China is increasing.
In 2009, 6,755 Taiwanese students were enrolled in Chinese colleges. Tai Sheng Yong Yue Fu
Dai Lu Nian Shu, Qia Wei Dai Zhong Hua [Taiwanese Students are Enthusiastic about
Studying in Mainland China, For Better Positions in Greater China], 24 June 2010, available
at http://www.177liuxue.cn/info/2010-7/133207.html (in Chinese) (visited 10 October 2010).
31 Taiwan Parliament Passes Bill to Admit Chinese Students, 19 August 2010, Channel News Asia,
available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1076016/1/.html
(visited 20 October 2010).
32 For example, one requirement for taking Taiwan’s bar exam is a bachelor’s degree in law
recognized by the Ministry of Education. ROC Regulations for the Senior Examination for
Professional and Technical Personnel: Lawyer, Articles 5 and 20. A candidate with a law
degree obtained in China is thus unable to meet this requirement.
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of the GATS simply stipulates that ‘a Member may recognize the education
obtained’ abroad.33 Absent a bilateral ‘agreement or arrangement’ regarding
this matter,34 Taiwan is not obliged to accord recognition of Chinese edu-
cational credentials. This argument nonetheless cannot stand. Notably,
Article VII of the GATS also emphasizes that such recognition cannot ‘con-
stitute a means of discrimination between countries’ that apply comparable
‘standards or criteria’.35 As Taiwan recognizes degrees from Vietnam, India
and Swaziland, it is difficult to contend that the standards or criteria of
Chinese intuitions are inferior to or fundamentally distinguishable from
their counterparts in these countries.36 In addition, this policy will likely
hurt Taiwan’s competitiveness in the long run because it encourages elite
Chinese graduates to go to Hong Kong and Singapore rather than Taiwan.
Finally, Taiwan imposes stringent restrictions on both outbound and in-
bound cross-straits investments. These restrictions aim to prevent Taiwan
from being ‘hollowed out’ by Mainland Chinese investment and to maintain
the country’s economic competitiveness, particularly in the technology in-
dustry. Currently, the cap on Taiwanese companies’ investments in China is
60% of their net worth and special approval is required if a project involves
more than an accumulated US$50 million.37 Restrictions on outbound in-
vestments are not within the purview of WTO law because the TRIMs
Agreement is concerned primarily with inbound investment. In Taiwan’s
trade regime, foreign investments are subject to the ‘negative list’ that ex-
cludes only industries with security or environmental concerns. Chinese in-
vestments are nonetheless confined to the ‘positive list’ of 192 items,38 which
explains why there is less than US$1 billion Chinese investments in Taiwan
in contrast to more than US$50 billion Taiwanese investments in China.39
Taiwan’s restrictions in this respect are contrary to WTO law. These restric-
tions may survive legal challenges under the TRIMs Agreement because
33 Emphasis added. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Article VII:1.
34 Ibid.
35 GATS, Article VII:3.
36 The Reference List of Foreign Universities, Bureau of International Cultural and Educational
Relations ROC, available at http://www.edu.tw/bicer/content.aspx?site_content_sn=8487 (vis-
ited 4 September 2010). Taiwan’s Ministry of Education expects to recognize degrees con-
ferred by 41 leading Chinese universities in 2011. Yojana Sharma, Taiwan: Way Clear for
Chinese Students Next Year, 29 August 2010, University World News, available at http://www.
universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20100828053320912 (visited 10 September
2010).
37 Taiwan Trade Policy Review Report (2010), above note 7, at 31–32.
38 Kai Fang Lu Zi Xun Xu Jian Jin, Ma Zheng Fu Xian Fang Xing 192xiang [Gradually Open
Mainland Investments, Ma Government Permits 192 Items], 30 June 2009, Zhong Guo Ping
Lun Xin Wen Wang [China Review News], available at http://www.chinareviewnews
.com/doc/1010/0/9/4/101009437.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=101009437 (in Chinese)
(visited 20 September 2010).
39 Lu Zi Lai Tai Yu Gui Yu Fan Xiang [Mainland Investments Come to Taiwan and Salmon
Return Home], 2 August 2010, Huaxia, available at http://big5.huaxia.com/thpl/mtlj/2010/08/
2016646.html (in Chinese) (visited 1 October 2010).
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Chinese investments, once allowed in Taiwan, are not subject to additional
restrictions, such as local content requirements. Yet, in addition to the
TRIMs Agreement that regulates goods-related investments, services-related
investments are governed by the GATS. If a WTO member is committed to
permitting the ‘commercial presence’ of foreign services providers (known as
GATS Mode 3), the member is also obliged to ‘allow such [associated]
movement of capital’ into its market.40 Consequently, Taiwan’s measures
that allow Chinese investments in only 22% of the items of its services
schedule41 infringe on Chinese investors’ rights under the GATS if
Chinese investors set-up commercial presence in Taiwan concerning other
items.
The analysis above illustrates WTO-inconsistent measures that China and
Taiwan have adopted for cross-straits trade. From a legal perspective, a
breached party will mostly likely resort to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism that has compulsory jurisdiction over legal matters arising from
WTO agreements. However, an anomaly in cross-straits relations is that
neither side has filed a WTO compliant against the other. On the one
hand, China intends to avoid ‘internationalization’ of cross-straits matters.
In its view, the utilization of the WTO tribunals may create the image of
‘state-to-state’ relations with Taiwan, thus diminishing Beijing’s sovereign
assertion over the island. On the other hand, Taiwan also has been hesitant
to bring WTO complaints against China due to the scale of its own
WTO-inconsistent measures.42 Bringing actions against Beijing may also
compel it to revoke preferential treatment for Taiwanese enterprises, which
would in turn undercut financial support for Taiwan’s ruling party.
III. REASONS FOR SIGNING THE ECFA IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST
ASIAN REGIONALISM
The process that began with WTO-incompatible measures leading to
WTO-plus treatment under the ECFA represents a significant advance not
only in cross-straits economic ties, but also in East Asian regionalism. This
fundamental change would not have been possible but for the new FTA and
the respective cross-straits policies of China and Taiwan. The following
40 GATS, Article XVI:1, footnote 8.
41 Gradually Open Mainland Investments, Ma Government Permits 192 Items, above note 38.
For additional information on Taiwan’s special commitments regarding ‘commercial pres-
ence’, see Taiwan WTO Services Schedule, above note 15.
42 For example, in 2002, China failed to notify the Taiwan government of China’s anti-dumping
and safeguard measures on Taiwanese steel products. Although such failure violated the no-
tification requirements under Article 6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 12 of the
Safeguard Agreement, Taiwan did not file a complaint against China. Hsieh, above note 9, at
1219–20. For information on China in WTO dispute settlement, see Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘China’s
Development of International Economic Law and WTO Legal Capacity Building’, 13 Journal
of International Economic Law 997 (2010), at 1028–36.
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sections examine the two political rivalries’ respective policy motivations for
concluding the ECFA.
A. China’s geopolitical and economic considerations for FTAs
The Doha Round impasse has prompted WTO members, including China,
to shift their trade policies toward bilateral FTAs. The ‘domino effect’
caused the rapid proliferation of FTAs in East Asia, leading to the region’s
‘noodle bowl syndrome’.43 Since China first signed CEPAs with Hong Kong
and Macau in 2003, it has concluded two regional trade agreements [China–
ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement] and six bi-
lateral FTAs.44 The ECFA with Taiwan may lead to China’s eleventh FTA.
There are salient, yet different, geopolitical and economic considerations
behind Beijing’s FTA strategy. First, China’s CEPAs with Hong Kong and
Macau were intended to implement the ‘one country, two systems’ scheme,
originally ‘designed’ for Taiwan.45 These CEPAs became the two first FTAs
concluded between customs territories within the same country. To justify
China’s takeover of Hong Kong and Macau, the continuing economic suc-
cess of these two Special Administrative Regions (SARs) was seen to be vital.
Beijing’s unilateral concessions under the CEPAs were deemed to be ‘gifts’
that would salvage Hong Kong’s and Macau’s economic downturn resulting
from the SARS outbreak. Because Hong Kong and Macau are WTO mem-
bers, the CEPAs (which are FTAs under Article XXIV of the GATT and
Article V of the GATS) prevent other WTO members from claiming MFN
treatment.
Second, China considers FTAs a mechanism to ‘rectify’ the discriminatory
WTO-plus obligations to which it committed in exchange for WTO mem-
bership.46 In particular, China is concerned about its trading partners’
43 Richard Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism, ADB
Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 7, at 5–6 (2007). For an analysis
of intra-Asian FTAs, see generally Bryan Mercurio, ‘Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreement
in Asia: A Sceptic’s View’, in Ross Buckley et al. (eds), East Asian Economic Integration: Law,
Trade and Finance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011).
44 China has concluded bilateral FTAs with Chile, Pakistan, Singapore, New Zealand, Peru and
Costa Rica. Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat, China, Revision, WT/TPR/
S.230/Rev.1 (5 July 2010) (China Trade Policy Review Report (2010)), at 16–20;
China-Costa Rica FTA, China FTA Network, available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/
encosta.shtml (visited 2 September 2010).
45 For additional information on the China-Hong Kong CEPA, see Mainland and Hong Kong
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA): Press Releases and Speeches, available at
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/press/cepa_press.html (visited 2 September 2010).
46 For example, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23
November 2001, Section 15 (Price Comparability in Determining Subsidies and Dumping)
and Section 16 (Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism); Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, 10 November 2001, para. 242 (measures
regarding textiles).
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‘abuse’ of China’s non-market economy status in trade remedies cases.47
This status allows WTO members to select surrogate markets (e.g. India
or Turkey) for calculating the normal value of Chinese exports, frequently
making Chinese companies liable in foreign anti-dumping proceedings.48 In
2009 alone, 38% of worldwide anti-dumping investigations were directed
against China, making the country the number one target of such proceed-
ings.49 China intends to tackle this issue on a bilateral basis by asking its
FTA partners to recognize its market economy status in their respective
FTAs.50
Finally, China’s FTA strategy is an integral part of its ‘peaceful rise’ policy,
which aims to escalate Chinese regional influence in both political and eco-
nomic arenas. FTAs with neighboring countries will not only ease concerns
over the ‘China threat’, but also safeguard foreign markets, as well as raw
material imports. More importantly, China intends to counterbalance US
influence in the region. While China acknowledges the United States’ inher-
ent role in Asia, it has been reluctant to incorporate the United States in
East Asian regionalism. This attitude is reflected in Beijing’s keen support of
the East Asian Economic Community (EAEC) on the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’
basis and its lukewarm approach to the US-proposed Free Trade Area of the
Asia Pacific (FTAAP) including 21 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) economies.51 The key difference in membership between the
EAEC and the FTAAP is that the former excludes both the United States
and Taiwan. Although it is still premature to assert that China is implement-
ing its own Monroe Doctrine in Asia, Beijing’s FTA strategy illustrates its
concerns about US ‘intervention’ in the region.
47 See US–China Bilateral WTO Agreement, 15 November 1999, available at http://clinton4.
nara.gov/WH/New/WTO-Conf-1999/factsheets/fs-004.html (explaining that under the
US–China Bilateral WTO Agreement, ‘the United States can continue to apply our current
non-market economy methodology in antidumping cases involving imports from China for 15
years’) (visited 1 October 2010).
48 On China’s Non Market Economy, G-IPR Global Research Center, 25 May 2009, available
at http://www.giprs.org/node/464 (visited 2 September 2010).
49 Exclusive-WTO Raps EU Anti-dumping in China Fasteners Case, 10 August 2010, Reuters, avail-
able at http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/08/10/exclusive-wto-raps-eu-anti-dumping-
china-fasteners-case/ (‘But for the entire history of the WTO since 1995, China has been
by far the biggest target of anti-dumping investigations . . . . In 2009 China was the target of
77 anti-dumping investigations out of a total of 201 . . . .’) (visited 10 September 2010).
50 For example, Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN (China–ASEAN Framework
Agreement), Article 14 (‘Each of the ten ASEAN Member States agrees to recognise
China as a full market economy and shall not apply . . . Sections 15 and 16 of the Protocol
of Accession of . . . China to the WTO and Paragraph 242 of the Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of China . . . .’).
51 See Dick K. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements
and US Policy, CRS Report for Congress, 4 January 2008, at 17–20 (discussing Asian trade
arrangements proposed by China, Japan and the United States). Taiwan joined the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) under the name ‘Chinese Taipei’ in 1993.
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When the anti-China Democratic Progressive Party was in office in Taiwan
from 2000 to 2008, the PRC fiercely opposed Taiwan’s FTA efforts.52
Beijing once declared that under its ‘one-China principle’, any countries
that sign FTAs with Taiwan would ‘bring political trouble to themselves’.53
China was concerned that any official agreements with Taiwan would con-
stitute implied recognition of the island. However, China faced a dilemma.
Its isolation policy limited ties with Taipei and strengthened Taiwan’s hostile
attitude toward Beijing. This attitude, in turn, also worked to fortify the
DPP’s popularity in Taiwanese elections. The year 2005 became a turning
point when Lien Chan visited China.54 Lien was then the chairman of
Taiwan’s opposition party, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT or
Kuomintang). His trip was symbolically important, given that he was the
first KMT chairman to visit the Mainland since Chiang Kai-shek fled to
Taiwan in 1949.
Lien’s visit was motivated by the KMT’s concern about worsening
cross-straits relations and by the party’s intention to establish contact with
Chinese leadership. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also seized the
opportunity presented by Lien’s visit because the CCP anticipated that the
KMT would adopt a more Beijing-friendly policy should it win Taiwan’s
2008 presidential election. In the long term, Beijing also expected that
cross-straits economic integration would promote political reunification.
Lien’s trip culminated in the KMT-CCP joint declaration, in which the
two parties agreed to promote ‘peace and development’ by establishing a
bilateral ‘economic cooperation mechanism’.55 This declaration was not le-
gally binding because the DPP administration did not designate signing au-
thority to the KMT. Nonetheless, it first provoked the idea of creating a
cross-straits trade agreement and paved the way for subsequent ECFA
negotiations.
B. Taiwan’s goal to prevent diplomatic and trade isolation
Taipei’s motivations for concluding the ECFA should be understood in
tandem with its FTA strategy. Taiwan is one of the robust ‘little dragons’
in East Asia, now the world’s most FTA-active region with 45 FTAs in
place.56 Taiwan and North Korea remain the only two Asian countries
excluded from regional economic integration. In the early 21st century,
52 Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progress Party was the ROC president from 2000 to 2008.
53 FTA with Taiwan Means Political Trouble: Official, 21 June 2002, China Daily, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/200206/21/eng20020621_98285.shtml (citing the statement by
then Chinese foreign trade minister, Shi Guangsheng) (visited 1 September 2010).
54 Backgrounder: ECFA, a Cross-Strait Economic Pact, 28 June 2010, Xinha News Agency
(LexisNexis News Database). Lien was the ROC vice president from 1996 to 2000.
55 Ibid.
56 See Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, Free Trade Agreements in East Asia: A Way
toward Trade Liberalization?, ADB Briefs, No. 1, June 2010 (‘By May 2010, East Asia had
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Taipei had failed to cement FTAs with any major trading partners, such
as the United States, the European Union and ASEAN states. Instead,
it signed FTAs with five of its Central American diplomatic allies:
Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.57 Under the
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR), Taiwanese exporters may take advantage of the agreement’s
preferential treatment to increase their share of the US market. Yet, bilateral
trade with these Central American nations constitutes merely 0.187% of
Taiwan’s total exports. This is a clear reflection of how political reality has
affected Taiwan’s foreign trade.58
Taiwan’s marginalization on the international trade stage can be attributed
to the PRC’s isolation policy.59 In practice, China denied that Taiwan pos-
sessed the ‘right’ to conclude FTAs. This position however is unfounded
under WTO law, as Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the
GATS respectively provide that provisions of economic integration apply to
all WTO ‘customs territories’ and ‘Members’.60 No WTO provision imposes
restrictions on any WTO member’s qualification or capability to conclude
FTAs. However, Beijing’s attitude created a ‘political chilling effect’ on
Taiwan’s potential FTA partners because they became concerned that con-
cluding FTAs with Taiwan would jeopardize trade and diplomatic ties with
China. This chilling effect can best be demonstrated by Mercosur’s prohib-
ition of its member states from signing FTAs with Taiwan.61 It was also
evident in the hesitant attitudes of parties to the Trans-Pacific Strategic
Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) toward Taiwan’s membership,
emerged at the forefront of global FTA activity, with 45 FTAs in effect and another 84 in
various stages of preparation’).
57 ECFA to Let Taiwan ‘Resume Regional Hub Status’: Economic Official, 17 June 2010, Focus
Taiwan News Channel, available at http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.
aspx?ID=201006170031&Type=aECO (visited 1 September 2010).
58 Ibid.
59 See Nanto, above note 51, at 10–11 (‘In some cases, the [trade] arrangements (or lack
thereof) are politically driven, particularly in the case of Taiwan as Beijing attempts to isolate
it diplomatically while Taipei tries to counter the diplomatic snubs that belie existing under-
lying trading relations’).
60 See GATT, Article XXIV:1 (‘The provision of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan
customs territories of the contracting parties and to any other customs territories . . . .’);
GATS, Article V:1 (‘This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a
party or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services . . . .’). See also, Michelle
Lu, US State Department affirms Taiwan’s right to sign FTAs, 9 June 2010, Taiwan Today,
available at http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=110075&CtNode=414 (‘ . . . . Taiwan
has the right to negotiate free trade agreements, and affirmed improving cross-straits relations
and Taiwan’s role in international affairs’) (visited 20 August 2010).
61 See Nanto, above note 51, at 16–17 (‘Pressure from China, however, apparently has
led . . . Mercosur to prohibit its members from signing unilateral trade agreements with
other economies, particularly as Mercosur considers an FTA with China’). Mercosur is the
Southern Common Market that includes Argentina, Brazil Paraguay and Uruguay.
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despite the TPP’s ‘open accession’ clause.62 These political factors cannot be
legally resolved under the WTO framework.
Furthermore, the formation of ‘ASEAN Plus One’ FTAs63 and the pro-
spective ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ FTA has made the ‘trade diversion’ theory a
reality for Taiwanese exporters. Korea’s competitiveness in ASEAN and
Chinese markets under these FTAs poses an imminent threat to Taiwan.
Korea and Taiwan overlap in 80% of their exports, predominantly in infor-
mation technology and machinery products.64 This ‘trade diversion’ impact
is substantiated by statistics. Two years before the Korea–ASEAN FTA took
effect in June 2007, Taiwan’s and Korea’s annual growth rates in exports for
ASEAN were 20.1% and 16.6%, respectively.65 Only a year after June 2007,
Taiwan’s growth rate plunged to 11.8% while Korea’s rose to 24%.66
What worries Taiwanese enterprises more is the loss of the Chinese market
to ASEAN and Korean competitors. After the China–ASEAN FTA took
effect in 2010, tariffs on the majority of ASEAN exports to China decreased
considerably, making them more competitive in China. For example, 43.34%
of Taiwanese petrochemical products are exported to China where they are
subject to a 6.49% tariff compared to only a 0.25% tariff for ASEAN prod-
ucts.67 Taiwan’s trade interests in China will further be eroded should the
Korea-China FTA or the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ framework be realized.
Statistics show that the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ FTA will decrease Taiwan’s
trade surplus by US$694 million per year, and reduce its gross domestic
62 This Agreement is also known as the P4 FTA because the members of the FTA include
Singapore, New Zealand, Chile and Brunei Darussalam. The ‘open accession clause’ of the
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) is Article 20.6.1, which
states that the agreement ‘is open to accession on terms to be agreed among the Parties,
by any APEC Economy or other State’. However, according to Taiwan’s Bureau of Foreign
Trade, P4 members do not support Taiwan’s ‘unilateral accession’ to the TPP because they
found it ‘sensitive’. Chun-Fang Hsu, APEC Jing Ji Zheng He Zhi Jin Zhan Ji Wo Guo Shen Yu
Qing Xing [Developments of APEC Economic Integration and Taiwan’s Participation], APEC
Shi Shi Lun Tan [APEC Forum], 30 October 2009, PowerPoint slides, at 11 (in Chinese) (on
file with the author).
63 For example, the China-ASEAN FTA, the Korea–ASEAN FTA, or the Japan–ASEAN FTA.
64 Johnny Chi-Chen Chiang, Wu Zhu ‘Dong Xie Jia Yi’ Lai SHi Xiong Xiong: Wei Lai Shi Nian
Tai Wan Bi Xu Zheng Shi De Tiao Zhan [Five ‘ASEAN Plus One’ Frameworks Are Forming
Rapidly], Jiao Liu [Exchange], No. 109, February 2010, at 36 (in Chinese). A total of 41.1%
and 15% of Taiwan’s exports go to China (including Hong Kong) and ASEAN, respectively.
Summary of 2009 ROC External Trade, above note 7.
65 Taipei Representative Office in Singapore, Liang An Jing Ji Xie Yi (ECFA) Zho Nei Han Ji Ke
Neng Ying Xiang [ECFA’s Contents and Potential Impact], 26 February 2010, PowerPoint
Slides, at 8 (in Chinese) (on file with the author).
66 Ibid.; China Trade Policy Review Report (2010), above note 44, at 91–104.
67 Top three Taiwanese products exported to China are petrochemical products (43.34%), ma-
chinery products (27.04%) and automobiles and auto-parts (5.4%). Chen-Te Huang, Liang
An Jing Ji He Zuo Jia Gou Xie Yi (ECFA) Zhi Yi Han [ECFA’s Meaning and Contents], The
11th International Conference on Cross-Straits Economy and Trade Management, 9 June
2010, PowerPoints Slides, at 21 (in Chinese) (on file with the author).
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product (GDP) by 0.836%.68 These declines would occur because compe-
tition from China, Korea, Japan and ASEAN is likely to replace Taiwanese
exports.
To counter Taiwan’s marginalization in FTA networks and expand the
country’s space in such networks, the newly elected Taiwan President
Ying-jeou Ma of the KMT proposed the ‘flexible diplomacy’ with a two-fold
goal in 2008.69 First, Taiwan is to ‘normalize’ economic ties with China by
concluding a bilateral FTA, which is expected to allow Taiwanese businesses
to maintain their advantages in the Chinese market. Taiwan also hopes to
circumvent the ‘investment diversion effect’, which has prompted foreign and
domestic investors to relocate to China due to Taiwan’s restrictions on
Chinese investments. In addition, the Taiwanese government expects to at-
tract FDI, as well as ‘go home’ investments by China-based Taiwanese en-
terprises. The ECFA is thus an indispensible building block for Taiwan to
constitute a regional hub that attracts foreign enterprises to establish head-
quarters or research and development (R&D) centers on its territory.
Additional inflow investments and the increase of employment will further
boost Taiwan’s economy. Second, Taiwan will be more pragmatic in its FTA
efforts. It will no longer insist on the use of ‘Taiwan’ or the ‘Republic of
China’ for its name in FTAs.70 Moreover, the ECFA will ease the chilling
effect on potential FTA partners for Taiwan because it is difficult for Beijing
to assert that ‘we can sign an FTA with Taiwan, but other countries cannot
do the same’.
After Ma took office in 2008, the KMT immediately resumed economic
negotiations with China, which had been suspended for 11 years.71 In just
two years, both governments concluded 12 agreements that liberalize restric-
tions on financial services, postal services, sea and air transport, tourism and
food safety.72 To echo Ma’s conciliatory approach, Chinese President Hu
Jintao stressed again that Beijing’s Taiwan policy would focus on enhancing
bilateral commercial ties by signing ‘an economic cooperation agreement’,
68 Ying-Hua Ku, ‘ECFA Dui Tai Wan De Zhong Yao Xing’ [‘The Importance of the ECFA to
Taiwan’], in Cyrus C.Y. Chu (ed), ECFA Kai Chuang Liagn An Hu Li Shuang Ying Xin Ju
Mian [The ECFA Leads to Mutual Benefit and the New Win-Win Stage of Cross-Straits
Relations] (Taipei: Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation, 2009) (in Chinese), at 45.
69 For information on Ma’s policy on China, see Taiwan’s Renaissance: Inaugural Address (20
May 2008), available at http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/
AboutPresident/pdf/section1.pdf (visited 1 October 2010); The Concept and Strategy of
‘Flexible Diplomacy’ and the Republic of China’s Foreign Relations: A Talk Delivered
during an Inspection Tour of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (4 August 2008), available at
http://english.president.gov.tw/Portals/4/images/PresidentOffice/AboutPresident/pdf/section2
.pdf (visited 1 September 2010).
70 In other words, Taiwan would accept the use of its WTO title, ‘Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu’ or ‘Chinese Taipei’, in bilateral FTAs.
71 China Focus: Mainland China, Taiwan Negotiators Make Last-Minute Preparations for New
Round of Talks, 28 June 2010, Xinhua News Agency (NexisLexis News Database).
72 Ibid.; Taiwan Trade Policy Review Report (2010), above note 7, at 91–104.
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represented by today’s ECFA.73 Interestingly, while a domino effect of po-
tential trade diversion was the main motivation for the ECFA, its conclusion
has had the paradoxical effect of promoting the proliferation of regional
FTAs in East Asia. A round of selective and competitive bilateral deals has
followed. For instance, 60% of Korean exports to China worth US$60 bil-
lion compete with Taiwan in the Chinese market.74 The fact that the ECFA’s
early harvest program alone would impair Korea’s trade interests in the
amount of US$12 billion gravely concerned Korean industries and caused
the Korean government to feel pressured to accelerate FTA negotiations with
China.75 Similarly, after the ECFA, Singapore immediately announced its
plan to negotiate an FTA with Taiwan.76 A prospective Taiwan–Singapore
FTA may prompt other ASEAN countries to negotiate FTAs with Taiwan.
Moreover, Hong Kong’s conclusion of an FTA with New Zealand after the
CEPA also suggests Beijing’s implied acquiescence toward ‘delinking’ sover-
eignty with trade agreements.77 These new developments indicate that the
ECFA would both integrate Taiwan in regional economic integration net-
works and accelerate East Asian regionalism.
IV. CONTENTS OF THE ECFA AND WTO LEGAL ISSUES
China and Taiwan conducted separate feasibility studies on the ECFA. The
results of the studies were positive for both economies. The ECFA is ex-
pected to increase Taiwan’s GDP by 1.65% and the balance of trade by
US$17.2 billion while augmenting China’s GDP by 0.63% and its balance
73 Russell Hsiao, Hu Jintao’s ‘Six-Points’ Proposition to Taiwan, 12 January 2009, 9 (1) China
Brief 1, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]
=34333&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=11701d2ca6 (visited 20 August 2010).
74 ECFA Will Hurt South Korean Export: Trade Group, 30 June 2010, China Post, available at
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2010/06/30/262706/ECFA-will
.htm (visited 20 August 2010).
75 Ibid.
76 See Mary Swire, Singapore Leader Favours Taiwan FTA, 19 September 2010, http://www
.tax-news.com/news/Singapore_Leader_Favours_Taiwan_FTA45265.html (‘Singapore’s
Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong . . . believes that the signing of a free trade agreement
(FTA) between Singapore and Taiwan would quickly lead to similar agreements between
Taiwan and other countries within the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN)’)
(visited 20 September 2010). See also, Taiwan-Singapore FTA Hinges on Cross-Strait Ties, 9
May 2008, China Post, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/2008/05/09/155579/
Taiwan-Singapore-FTA.htm (‘Singapore will only be able to sign a free trade agreement
(FTA) with Taiwan if Taiwan improves its relations with China, Singaporean Minister
Mentor Lee Kuan Yew said . . . .’) (visited 20 August 2010); Iana Dreyer et al., Beyond
Geopolitics – The Case for a Free Trade Accord between Europe and Taiwan, ECIPE Occasional
Paper, No. 3/2010 (2010), at 7 (arguing that after signing the ECFA, the EU should ‘respond
positively to an FTA request by Taiwan’).
77 Hong Kong – New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement was signed on 29
March 2010. Hong Kong – New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, available
at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade_relations/hknzcep/index.html (visited 1 October 2010).
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of trade by US$58.97 billion.78 Since the beginning of 2010, expert groups
and negotiators from both sides have discussed the title and basic structure
for the ECFA.79 The negotiations were concluded with the signing of the
ECFA, along with the Cross-Straits Agreement on Intellectual Property
Rights Protection and Cooperation (Cross-Straits IPR Agreement).80 Both
agreements took effect in September 2010 following the completion of
China’s and Taiwan’s domestic implementation procedures.81 Modeled on
the China–ASEAN Framework Agreement, the ECFA provides a legal basis
for negotiating subsequent agreements. Within six months, China and
Taiwan will negotiate four agreements that govern trade in goods, trade in
services, investments and dispute settlement.82 These agreements will
become an integral part of the ECFA.83 Like most FTAs, the ECFA also
contains a termination clause, which is the agreement’s ultimate safety
valve,84 although neither China nor Taiwan would likely annul the ECFA
in light of current cross-straits developments.
A. ASEAN framework agreements as the ECFA’s model
Notwithstanding the ECFA’s economic nature, the signing of the agreement
was a political decision. Searching for an appropriate FTA model was the
prime task for negotiators, particularly given the wide range of FTAs that
differ in title and scope. It is thus important to explain why China and
Taiwan followed the ‘ASEAN framework agreements’ approach rather than
‘one-step’ FTAs or CEPAs. A normal one-step FTA was not acceptable to
either Beijing or Taipei. In China’s view, a cross-straits pact entitled ‘FTA’
78 Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research (Taiwan WTO Center), Liang An Jing Ji He
Zuo Jia Gou Xie Yi Zhi Ying Xiang Ping Gu: Zhai Yao Yue Ming [Summary Information on the
ECFA’s Impact Evaluation], 29 July 2009, at 6 (in Chinese); Chinese Academy of
International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Liang An Jing Ji He Zuo Jia Gou Xie Yi
Zhai Yao Yue Ming [Summary Information on the ECFA], 13 October 2009, available at
http://tga.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/ecfa/subjectjj/201007/20100707017974.html?
1521721961=3878450466 (in Chinese) (visited 1 September 2010).
79 Backgrounder: ECFA, a Cross-Strait Economic Pact, above note 54.
80 The ECFA and the Cross-Straits Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection and
Cooperation (Cross-Straits IPR Agreement) were signed during the fifth round of the
Chiang-Cheng Talks in Chongqing on 29 June 2010.
81 Landmark Cross-Strait Pact to Take Effect on Sept. 12, 11 September 2010, Radio Taiwan
International, available at http://english.rti.org.tw/Content/GetSingleNews.aspx?Content
ID=109536 (visited 20 September 2010). Under Taiwanese law, cross-straits agreements
are not treaties with foreign states. Judicial Yuan, Interpretation No. 329. Pursuant to the
Statute Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland
Area, Taiwan’s Congress (Legislative Yuan) ratified the ECFA on 17 August 2010. China
does not consider the ECFA as a treaty, meaning that the ECFA was not required to be
ratified by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
82 ECFA, Articles 3.1, 4.1, 5.1 and 10.1.
83 Ibid., Article 13.
84 Ibid., Article 16.
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would suggest inter-state relations under international law.85 Furthermore,
an FTA that immediately liberalizes both sides’ WTO-inconsistent measures
would incur fierce opposition from domestic industries. In Taiwan, a refer-
endum result opposing the ECFA could have even constitutionally blocked
the administration from continuing negotiations under Taiwanese law.86
Politically speaking, Beijing wished to adopt the CEPA model for a
cross-straits trade pact because it would show the supremacy of the central
government over its own separate customs territories. For example, China
and Hong Kong signed the CEPA in 2003, and subsequently signed seven
supplemental agreements to further liberalize bilateral trade in goods and
services.87 Nevertheless, this approach was unacceptable to Taipei for several
reasons.
First and foremost, the CEPA approach would downgrade the status of
Taiwan to that of Hong Kong by implying that Taiwan fell under the PRC’s
jurisdiction. China’s careful choice of the word ‘arrangement (an pai)’, in-
stead of ‘agreement (xie ding)’, in the CEPA’s title avoids acknowledgment of
the CEPA as an international instrument. Meanwhile, Article 2 of the CEPA
specifically recognizes the PRC’s ‘one China, two systems’ as a political
precondition.88 The fact that the China-Hong Kong CEPA was signed by
the PRC’s Vice Minister of Commerce and Hong Kong SAR’s Financial
Secretary indicates the internal nature of the CEPA. These political shadings
made the CEPA approach unacceptable to the Taiwanese leadership.
Second, the CEPA not only recognizes China’s market economy status,
but also makes anti-dumping and countervailing measures on products
from either side inapplicable.89 Giving up such measures to counter the
85 Tan Wei, Head of the Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, PRC Ministry
of Commerce, stated that ‘we would like to sign a free trade agreement with [Taiwan], but the
agreement cannot be called an ‘‘FTA’’.’ Bu Qian ECFA, Ming Nian Tai Wan Shi Ye Dai Zeng;
Dai Lu Shi Tai Jin Rong Ye Guo Ji Hua De Di Yi Bu [Unemployment in Taiwan will Increase
Next Year if the ECFA is Unable to Be Concluded; The Mainland is the First Step for
Internationalization of Taiwan’s Finance Industry], 21 January 2010, available at http://
www.adj.idv.tw/html/59/t-14959.html (in Chinese) (visited 20 June 2010).
86 See ECFA Referendum Rejected Again, 13 August 2010, Chinese Television System, available
at http://news.cts.com.tw/cts/english/201008/201008130538867.html (‘Following a previous
failed attempt, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) made another proposal to settle the dis-
putes over ECFA through a referendum, only to see it rejected again by the government’s
committee for not conforming to the law’) (visited 1 October 2010).
87 Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), available at
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/further_liberal.html (‘ . . . Pursuant to Article 3 of
CEPA, . . . the two sides signed six Supplements to CEPA on 27 October 2004, 18 October
2005, 27 June 2006, 29 June 2007, 29 July 2008 and 9 May 2009 respectively . . . [and] signed
Supplement VII to CEPA on 27 May 2010 . . . .’) (visited 1 October 2010).
88 CEPA provides that it adheres to five principles, including ‘one country, two systems’ and
WTO requirements. Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement
(CEPA), Articles 2.1 and 2.2.
89 CEPA, Articles 4, 7 and 8.
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potential rapid inflow of Chinese products would cause serious concern to
Taiwanese businesses.
Finally, the CEPA’s politically oriented dispute settlement mechanism pro-
vided limited guidance for resolving disputes. Article 19 of the CEPA merely
stipulates that a Joint Steering Committee comprised of senior officials will
deal with CEPA matters ‘through consultation in the spirit of friendship and
cooperation’.90 The CEPA does not include procedures for resorting to this
mechanism, nor does it envision further negotiations over a detailed dispute
settlement agreement. This deficiency is compounded by the fact that the
CEPA lacks investor-state arbitration, which would be of paramount import-
ance to Taiwanese investors in China. These distinctive features of the CEPA
incurred fierce opposition in Taiwan and made it undesirable for the ECFA
to follow the CEPA model. Indeed, the KMT government had to change the
name of the proposed agreement from the ‘Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Agreement’ (CECA) to ‘ECFA’ because the former suggests
that it was a Taiwan version of the CEPA.91
Distinguishable from a one-step FTA and the CEPA, ASEAN’s framework
agreements provide a suitable model for both China and Taiwan. The
ECFA’s title as ‘framework agreement’, instead of ‘FTA’, would avoid sov-
ereignty concerns. Under WTO law, a framework agreement, known as an
‘interim agreement’ under Article XXIV of the GATT, is the lowest level of
economic integration leading to a full FTA.92 In practice, ASEAN collect-
ively has concluded FTAs with China, Korea, Japan and India on the basis of
bilateral framework agreements.93 This building block approach suits polit-
ically sensitive trade ties across the Taiwan Strait. Among ASEAN’s FTAs,
negotiators from China and Taiwan pay particular attention to the China–
ASEAN FTA that was finalized in 2010.94 The CAFTA started with the
China–ASEAN Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation (China–ASEAN Framework Agreement) in 2002 and was sup-
plemented by four enabling agreements on trade in goods (2004), dispute
settlement (2004), trade in services (2007) and investments (2009).95 The
China–ASEAN Framework Agreement provided the legal basis for
90 Ibid., Articles 19.1–19.4.
91 Zhao Hong and Sarah Y. Tong, Taiwan-Mainland Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA): Implications for Cross-Strait Relations, EAI Background Brief, No. 452 (21 May
2009), at 5.
92 GATT, the chapeau to Article XXIV:5, XXIV:5(a) and (b) and XXIV:7(a). Trade arrange-
ments by intensity are: (i) trade under WTO rules; (ii) framework agreement; (iii) Economic
Partnership Agreement; (iv) Free Trade Area; and (v) Common market. Nanto, above note
51, at 10.
93 In addition to ASEAN, India has concluded framework agreements that committed to liberal-
izing trade with Thailand, Chile, Mercosur and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
94 China–ASEAN FTA, available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinaasean.shtml (visited 1
October 2010).
95 Ibid.
140 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL)
negotiating these subsequent agreements leading to a final FTA within the
10-year timeframe.96
In general, ASEAN’s framework agreements contain certain features that
make them cornerstones for ultimate WTO-plus FTAs. First, the framework
agreement includes an ‘early harvest program’, which immediately liberalizes
trade in goods.97 The EHP’s coverage is often seen as a political benchmark
for parties’ ‘sincerity’ regarding economic integration. Invariably, the EHP is
the core of framework agreement negotiations. Second, the goods that the
EHP does not cover will be placed on ‘normal’ and ‘sensitive’ tracks subject
to different timeframes and rates of tariff reduction.98 The lists of goods on
these two tracks are negotiated as part of the subsequent agreement on trade
in goods. The fact that ‘sensitive’ goods would be allowed a longer period
for, or even be immune from, liberalization also allows vulnerable domestic
industries to gradually transform and upgrade themselves to cope with com-
petition. Finally, the framework agreement provides a timetable for other
enabling agreements that lead to an FTA.99 Thus, parties are legally
bound to engage in subsequent negotiations. As a whole, the enabling agree-
ments under the framework agreement result in an FTA that accords
WTO-plus treatment to contracting parties.
B. The early harvest program and prospective liberalization
The various features and negotiation models of ASEAN framework agree-
ments have influenced the ECFA’s negotiations and structure. The final text
of the ECFA includes 16 articles in five chapters, along with five annexes.100
Because the EHP will directly impact industries’ trade interests, the coverage
under the EHP was at the center of ECFA negotiations. To understand the
EHP and prospective liberalization in cross-straits trade, it is important to
first discuss the evolution of the negotiating mechanism and Beijing’s
‘making concessions (rang li)’ policy.
96 China–ASEAN Framework Agreements, Article 2.
97 China–ASEAN Framework Agreement, Article 6. Pakistan used the ‘agreements on the early
harvest program (EHP)’ as the preliminary step for FTAs. The scope of these agreements,
which solely stipulate the EHP, is narrower than that of ASEAN’s framework agreements.
For additional information, see Pakistan’s Agreements on the Early Harvest Program for the
Free Trade Agreement with Malaysia and China, both signed in 2005.
98 China–ASEAN Framework Agreements, Article 2(4).
99 For example, China-ASEAN Framework Agreements, Articles 8 and 11.
100 After the Preamble, the five chapters include Chapter 1: General Provisions, Chapter 2:
Trade and Investment Liberalization, Chapter 3: Economic Cooperation, Chapter 4: Early
Harvest and Chapter 5: Miscellaneous Items. The five annexes include Annex 1: List of
EHP Goods; Annex 2: Interim Rules of Origin Applied to EHP Goods; Annex 3: Safeguard
Measures Applied to EHP Goods; Annex 4: List of EHP Services Sectors; and Annex 5:
Definition of EHP Service Provider.
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As the Preamble to the ECFA indicates, this landmark agreement was
concluded based on ‘equality and reciprocity’.101 The ECFA was signed
between two semi-official organizations, China’s Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF). While the former is under the Taiwan Affairs Office of
the PRC State Council, the latter falls under the Mainland Affairs Council
of the ROC Executive Yuan. The creation of the ARATS and SEF allowed
both sides’ policies to avoid ‘official’ contact. The ARATS-SEF formula
distinguishes the ECFA from the CEPA, as the latter was concluded between
the central government and its SAR. Unlike the CEPA, the ECFA contains
neither the ‘one China, two systems’ precondition nor political discourse
concerning reunification of both sides. This equal political status between
Beijing and Taipei was a cornerstone of ECFA negotiations. In addition, the
ECFA expects the current negotiating mechanism to evolve. The ECFA
mandates that both governments establish a ‘Cross-Straits Economic
Cooperation Committee’ (CSEC Committee) to deal with negotiations for
the subsequent four agreements.102 This CSEC Committee, composed of
senior officials from both sides, will be the first ‘joint’ organization in
cross-straits relations. These officials will represent relevant ministries direct-
ly in charge of trade affairs. Hence, the CSEC Committee intends to be
more efficient than the ARATS-SEF mechanism. By its nature, the ECFA
is a trade agreement, but it will be interesting to see whether the operation of
a joint committee will provide a precedent for cross-straits political affairs.
Moreover, it took less than a year from the initial negotiations of the
ECFA to the final inking.103 This accelerated process has primarily been
attributed to PRC leadership’s political decision to ‘make concessions’
to Taiwan.104 It was this decision that broke the negotiating impasse over
liberalization of coverage under the EHP. Beijing applied a similar
concession-making strategy to CEPA and CAFTA negotiations. From
China’s perspective, the long-term political gains from these FTAs sur-
mounted economic interests. This realization is particularly true in the
101 ECFA, Preamble.
102 Ibid., Article 11.
103 At the meeting in December 2008 in Taichung, Taiwan, representatives of the Association
for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the Straits Exchange Foundation
(SEF) first agreed to list the ECFA on the agenda of subsequent meetings, which were
held three times from January to June 2010; the ARATS and SEF concluded the ECFA
in Chonqing, China in June 2010. Liang An Jing Ji He Zho Kuang Jia Xie Yi Jin Qi Sheng
Xiao: Huo Ji Ji Ken Ding [ECFA that Took Effect Today Received Positive Responses],
Zhong Guo Jing Ji Wang [China Economic Network], 12 September 2010, available at
http://big5.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201009/12/t20100912_21810879.shtml (in Chinese) (vis-
ited 15 September 2010).
104 MAC Minister Lauds Cross-Strait ‘Mutuality’, 15 March 2010, Taiwan Today, available at
http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=96049&CtNode=445 (‘Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao’s suggestions that Beijing will make concessions to Taipei in the early harvest and
tariff reduction list . . . .’) (visited 10 October 2010).
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case of the ECFA because the KMT will face intense challenges from the
DPP in Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election. Beijing is reluctant to see nega-
tive results from the ECFA orient Taiwan’s election results in favor of the
DPP, which could reverse Taipei’s China-friendly policy.
This background contributes to several unique features of the ECFA’s
early harvest program. As the EHP covers trade in goods and services, it
is the world’s first EHP that includes trade in services. Due to Beijing’s
concession-making policy, the ECFA is an interim agreement that includes
the world’s most imbalanced EHP with the largest scale of liberalization ever
seen. On the subject of trade in goods, for example, Beijing will eliminate or
lower tariffs on 539 Taiwanese items, accounting for 16.1% of China’s im-
ports from Taiwan and totaling US$138.4 billion.105 In contrast, Taipei will
only do the same for 267 Chinese items, accounting for 10.5% of Taiwan’s
imports from China and totaling US$28.6 billion.106 Under the ECFA, the
percentage of liberalization in cross-straits trade is significant, particularly
in comparison with the early harvest program of the China–ASEAN
Framework Agreement, which only accounts for 1.8% of bilateral trade.107
The unilateral concession on the agricultural sector is particularly note-
worthy. While China agreed to accord preferential tariffs to 18 Taiwanese
agricultural products, Taiwan will continue its MFN-inconsistent ban on the
importation of 830 Chinese agricultural products and will not lower tariffs
on 1,415 such products.108
Similar to its motivation for the ‘fruit diplomacy’, Beijing attempted to
ease Taiwanese farmers’ opposition to the ECFA. Consequently, the ratio of
liberalization as to China’s and Taiwan’s commitments under the EHP is 2:1
in items and 5:1 in monetary value.109 Both sides agreed to gradually elim-
inate tariffs on EHP items over two years, depending on existing tariffs.110
105 Bureau of Foreign Trade, Di Wu Ci ‘Jiang-Chen Hui Tan’ Shun Li Qian Shu ‘Hai Xia Liang
An Jing Ji He Zho Jia Gou Xie Yi’ Ji ‘Hai Xia Liang An Zhi Hui Cai Chan Quan Bao Hu Xia
Yi’, Jing Ji Bu Ji Ni Ying Jie Taiwan Wei Lai Jing Ji Fa Zhan De Huang Jin Shi Nian, Yu Dai
Jie Zuo Huo Da Ping Ying XIan Ji [Fifth ‘Chiang-Chen Meeting’ Successfully Concluded the
‘ECFA’ and the ‘Cross-Straits IPR Agreement’, Ministry of Economic Affairs Actively
Embraces Taiwan’s Golden 10 years for the Future Economic Development and Works
with Everyone to Seize Opportunities] (Fifth Chiang-Chen Meeting), 29 June 2010, avail-
able at http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/News.aspx?kind=1&menu_id=40&
news_id=19039 (in Chinese) (10 October 2010); see generally, Annex I: Product List and
Tariff Reduction Arrangements under the Early Harvest For Trade in Goods (ECFA Annex
I).
106 Fifth Chiang-Chen Meeting, above note 105; ECFA Annex I, above note 105.
107 Zhi Biao Xing Xiang Mu [Index Items], 25 June 2010, Lian He Bao [United Daily News], at
A2.
108 Fifth Chiang-Chen Meeting, above note 105.
109 Ibid.
110 For information on three tariff reduction categories, see ECFA Annex I, above note 105, at
12 and 32.
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In this manner, they expect to reach their goal of zero tariffs for the EHP in
January 2013. Compared to liberalization in trade in goods, the scope of the
EHP’s liberalization in services is limited. China will open 11 services sectors
to Taiwan, whereas Taiwan will open 9 sectors to China.111 Overall, China
accords Taiwan WTO-plus treatment, whereas the scope of Taiwan’s liber-
alization is mostly on a par with its WTO commitments.
The ECFA is undoubtedly important to industries. Indeed, business inter-
ests primarily account for the ECFA tug-of-war negotiations. In terms of
goods liberalization, the ECFA largely alleviates the threat of ‘trade diver-
sion’ for Taiwan because the EHP includes 20% of Taiwanese products that
would be disadvantaged by the CAFTA and 17% of products that are in
direct competition with products of Korean and Japanese origin.112 The
most significant beneficiaries are Taiwanese manufacturers of petrochemical
products, machine tools and textiles.113 Although 88 petrochemical products
are included in the EHP, these items account for only 10% of the items that
Taiwan initially requested.114 Due to intense opposition from Chinese
state-owned petrochemical enterprises, Beijing insisted on excluding most
petrochemical products from the EHP, particularly Taiwan’s competitive
polyvinyl chloride (PVC).115 This fact demonstrates Chinese enterprises’
growing influence in FTA negotiations and their ability to set boundaries
on the government’s concession-making policies.
With respect to trade in services, the banking industry benefits most.
Chinese banks will be allowed to establish branches in Taiwan and engage
in the New Taiwan dollar business.116 Similar to the China-Hong Kong
CEPA, China will allow Taiwanese banks to set up branches and conduct
Renminbi business after they operate for two years and earn profit for
111 Fifth Chiang-Chen Meeting, above note 105.
112 Ibid.
113 Table 1: Good Items in the ‘Early Harvest’ List, Economics: Taiwan-China: A Quick Look at
the ECFA, 29 June 2010, DBS Group Research, available at https://www.dbsvresearch.com/
research/DBS/research.nsf/(vwAllDocs)/F678A45CFC276BA5482577510031F27F/$FILE/
tw_2010Jun29.pdf (visited 10 October 2010).
114 Ibid.; Chen You-Zhen, 9 Cheng Shi Hua Chan Pin Wei Lie ECFA Zao Shou Qing Dan [90% of
Petrochemical Products Were Not Included in the ECFA’s Early Harvest List], 26 May
2010, available at http://times.hinet.net/times/article.do?newsid=3159066&option=mainland
(in Chinese) (visited 11 October 2010).
115 Judith Wang and Nurluqman Suratman, China-Taiwan ECFA Excludes PVC from List of 88
Petchems, 25 June 2010, Icis.Com, available at http://www.icis.com/Articles/2010/06/25/
9371075/china-taiwan-ecfa-deal-excludes-pvc-from-list-of-88-petchems.html (visited 11
October 2010). Interestingly, China accords zero-tariff treatment to PVC from ASEAN,
but declined to do so for Taiwan. The reason is that PVC factories in ASEAN (particularly
Singapore) are primarily invested by Japanese and their high-end products with higher costs
that are not likely to compete with Chinese products, as their Taiwanese counterparts may
do.
116 Annex IV: Sectors and Liberalization Measures under the Early Harvest for Trade in
Services (ECFA Annex IV), at 4.
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a year.117 In addition, the ECFA accords more preferential terms than the
CEPA for Taiwanese banks that engage in Renminbi business with
Taiwanese enterprises in China.118 This ‘CEPA-plus’ treatment may
prompt Hong Kong and Macau to request further liberalization from
China in financial services. The ECFA will thus indirectly accelerate eco-
nomic integration between China, Hong Kong and Macau as well.
The early harvest program of the ECFA is only an ‘appetizer’ for the
prospective cross-straits free-trade area. It is expected that further liberaliza-
tion of goods, services and investments will be covered in subsequent agree-
ments along with IPR issues. For instance, the ECFA’s ‘economic
cooperation’ section includes reference to ‘intellectual property rights protec-
tion and cooperation’.119 This section should be read in tandem with the
Cross-Straits IPR Agreement, signed simultaneously with the ECFA. As dis-
cussed previously, China does not accept Taiwanese nationals’ ‘right of pri-
ority’ applications because the Paris Convention does not apply to Taiwan.
Under the Cross-Straits IPR Agreement, this TRIPS-inconsistent measure
will be abolished since both sides are obliged to extend the right of priority
to patent, trademark and plant variety applications.120 The Cross-Straits IPR
Agreement also offers protection for geographical indications and
well-known trademarks.121 This protection is vital to Taiwanese exporters
because it has been common for Chinese manufacturers to fabricate or ma-
liciously register the names of Taiwanese products, such as Alishan high
mountain tea, Chishan rice and Yonghe soybean milk.122 The Cross-Straits
IPR Agreement provides a mechanism for the PRC and ROC IP authorities
to discuss these matters and enforce IP rights. The ECFA, built on the basis
117 Ibid., at 9. See Table 1: Good Items in the ‘Early Harvest’ List, Economics: Taiwan-China:
A Quick Look at the ECFA, above note 113 (stating that this ‘is the same treatment China
offered to Hong Kong banks under the CEPA, and superior to the WTO treatment
(requiring 3 years of operation and 2 years of profits)’).
118 ECFA Annex IV, above note 116, at 9; see Table 1: Good Items in the ‘Early Harvest’ List,
Economics: Taiwan-China: A Quick Look at the ECFA, supra note 113 (‘[T]he license
requirement is lowered further to 1 year operation (earning profits for 1 year), which is
even less restrictive than under the CEPA’); Li and Fung Research Centre, Analysis of
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between the Chinese
Mainland and Taiwan, Issue 67, June 2010, available at http://www.idsgroup.com/profile/
pdf/distributing/issue67.pdf (‘One highlight is that Taiwanese banks are granted to do
Renminbi (RMB) business to Taiwan companies after establishing branch [sic] and being
profitable for one year vs two years under the [China-Hong Kong CEPA] and three years
under the [WTO]’) (visited 12 October 2010).
119 ECFA, ch. 3.
120 Cross-Straits IPR Agreement, Article 2.
121 Ibid., Article 7.
122 Liang An Zhi Hui Cai Chan Quan Bao Hu He Zho Xie Yi Xiang Guan Wen Da [Cross-Straits
IPR Agreement Relevant Q&A], 22 June 2010, available at http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct
.asp?xItem=85905&ctNode=5706&mp=2 (in Chinese) (visited 12 October 2010).
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of the Cross-Straits IPR Agreement, obliges both sides to engage in negoti-
ations with respect to the eventual scope and plan of IPR protection.123
Hence, the ECFA and its enabling agreements will likely prompt both
China and Taiwan to gradually reduce WTO-inconsistent measures and
make the future cross-straits FTA a WTO-plus one.
C. The WTO consistency of the ECFA as an interim agreement
The ECFA’s imbalanced liberalization and unique ‘cross-straits characteris-
tics’ have stirred intense discussions about the consistency of FTA require-
ments under WTO law. Given that WTO members lack consensus on most
substantive requirements, the ECFA cannot be labeled as WTO-inconsistent.
However, as the ECFA’s unique ‘cross-straits characteristics’ depart from
traditional interim agreements, these features will likely be subject to the
WTO’s intense scrutiny.
During ECFA negotiations, Taiwan intended to include an ‘international
linkage’ provision that ‘requires’ Beijing not to block Taiwan’s FTAs with its
trade partners.124 China also proposed the inclusion of cross-straits trade
‘normalization’ in the ECFA’s text with the intention of obliging Taiwan
to remove all barriers to Chinese exporters and service-providers.125 A
mutual compromise was not to include these provisions, but to adopt rela-
tively vague provisions that incorporate the ‘concepts’ on which both sides
insisted. The ECFA aims to ‘gradually reduce or eliminate barriers to trade
and investment’ in compliance with the WTO’s ‘basic principles’.126 While
recognizing these principles, they also agreed to take into account their re-
spective ‘economic conditions’.127 This provision illustrates Taiwan’s reluc-
tant promise to entirely remove its trade barriers on China and raises
controversies as to the ECFA’s consistency with FTA procedural and sub-
stantive requirements.
1. Procedural requirements
On the procedural front, the 2006 WTO General Council Decision on the
Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements requires China
123 ECFA, Article 6.1(1).
124 He Ming-Guo & Chen Xiu-Lan, ECFA Jie Mi, 6 Xiang Tuo Xie Bao Tai Kong Jian, Wen Ben
Gong 16 Tiao Wen, Zi Zi Qian Zang Liang An Zheng Zhi Jiao Li [Unveil the ECFA’s Secrets,
6 Compromises that Keep Taiwan’s Flexibility, The Text Includes 16 Provisions, Which
Show Political Bargains between the Two Sides], 30 June 2010, Zhong Shi Dian Zi Bao
[China Times], available at http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/ECFA/news-2010063003.
htm (in Chinese) (visited 13 November 2010).
125 Ibid.
126 See ECFA, preamble (‘Have Agreed, in line with the basic principles of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and in consideration of the economic conditions of the two sides, to
gradually reduce or eliminate barriers to trade and investment . . . .’). In Taiwan’s view, the
WTO ‘basic principles’ refer to China’s acknowledgement of Taiwan’s ‘FTA rights’ under
the WTO.
127 Ibid.
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and Taiwan to notify the WTO ‘before the application of preferential treat-
ment’ under the ECFA.128 Like the China–ASEAN Framework Agreement,
the ECFA is an ‘interim agreement necessary for’ or ‘leading to’ a cross-straits
free-trade area.129 Although the difference between an ‘interim agreement’
and a final regional trade agreement (RTA) exists for the purposes of the
Transparency Mechanism, no distinction between the two has been drawn
with respect to their WTO notification requirement.130 In fact, none of the
trade agreements concluded to date among WTO members have been noti-
fied as interim agreements. For example, despite its ‘interim’ nature indi-
cated by a 10-year transitional period, the EC-Chile Interim Agreement was
reported to the WTO as a full agreement.131 Given that the ECFA is based
on Article XXIV of the GATT and Article IV of the GATS, China and
Taiwan are required to notify the Council for Trade in Goods and the
Council for Trade in Services as required by the Transparency
Mechanism.132 As the ECFA took effect in September 2010 and its early
harvest program will be implemented on 1 January 2011, the notification
requirement should be completed prior to that date.133
2. Substantive requirements
While the procedural WTO notification requirement does not pose problems
for the ECFA, disputes arise when it comes to the ECFA’s consistency with
128 General Council, Decision on a Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements
(Transparency Decision), WT/L/671, 18 December 2006, para. 3. For additional informa-
tion on the Transparency Mechanism, see generally, Jo-Ann Crawford, ‘A New Transparency
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements’, 11 Singapore Yearbook of International Law
133 (2007).
129 Emphasis added. See GATT, Article XXIV:5 (‘ . . . an interim agreement necessary for the
formation of a . . . free-trade area . . . .’); GATT, Article XXIV:7(a) (‘ . . . an interim agreement
leading to the formation of such a[n] . . . area . . . .’); Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Article XXIV
Understanding), paras 1 and 12 (‘ . . . interim agreement leading to the formation of
a . . . free trade area’).
130 See Lorand Bartels, ‘ ‘‘Interim Agreements’’ under Article XXIV GATT’, 8 (2) World Trade
Review (2009) 339, at 342 (‘[T]he Decision makes no distinction between interim and ‘‘full’’
regional trade agreement with an implementation period’).
131 Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), Examination of the Interim Agreement
between the EC and Chile – Note on the Meeting of 28 July 2005, WT/REG/164/M/1, 6
October 2005, para. 10.
132 Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Notification Format for Regional Trade
Agreements, WT/REG/16, 23 November 2006. The ECFA cannot be based on the
Enabling Clause because of the ECFA’s reciprocal, albeit asymmetrical, nature and because
Taiwan’s is deemed to be a ‘developed rather than developing country member’ in the WTO.
During its WTO accession process, Taiwan committed that it ‘would not claim any rights
under the WTO agreements to developing country members . . . ’. Working Party on the
Accession of Chinese Taipei, WT/ACC.TPKM/18, 5 October 2001, para. 6.
133 Notes in ECFA Annex I, Product List and Tariff Reduction Arrangements under the Early
Harvest for Trade in Goods (Notes in ECFA Annex I) provide that ‘if the Agreement enters
into force in the second half of the year, the Early Harvest Program shall be implemented on
January 1st of the next year’.
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substantive FTA requirements. These substantive requirements were also at
the core of the ECFA debate between Taiwan President Ma and Tsai
Ing-wen, the DPP Chairman, in April 2010.134 Article XXIV:5(c) of the
GATT mandates that an interim agreement contain ‘a plan and schedule
for the formation of . . . a free trade area within a reasonable length of
time.’135 These requirements should be interpreted interdependently. First,
neither WTO rules nor jurisprudence set out a degree of specificity concern-
ing a ‘plan and schedule’. Nevertheless, a holistic interpretation of the
Transparency Decision would reveal that the plan and schedule must contain
enough information for the WTO Secretariat to prepare a factual presenta-
tion, including ‘when the agreement is to be implemented by stages’.136 The
term ‘by stages’ should refer to a requirement as to when the interim agree-
ment will lead to a final FTA rather than when the EHP under such an
agreement will be implemented. For instance, the China–ASEAN
Framework Agreement not only provides that the CAFTA will be created
‘within 10 years’,137 but also includes a specific timeframe that requires the
subsequent Agreement on Trade in Goods to commence in 2003 and to be
concluded in 2004.138 Article 8(1) further sets 2010 and 2015 as deadlines for
the implementation of the CAFTA for different groups of ASEAN states.139
Unlike the China–ASEAN Framework Agreement, the ECFA neither
mentions a 10-year transitional period nor sets a deadline for the completion
of the cross-straits FTA. The ECFA only requires both sides to commence
negotiations regarding trade in goods and services ‘within 6 months’ after the
ECFA takes effect and to ‘expeditiously conclude’ these negotiations.140 In
other words, the ECFA arranges for open-ended negotiations for completing
the cross-straits FTA. Remarkably, it was this ‘open-ended’ nature that gal-
vanized the United States to heavily criticize the China-Pakistan FTA.141
134 For details, see Ma, Tsai Lock Horns in ECFA Debate, 26 April 2010, Taipei Times, at A3.
135 Emphasis added. GATT, Article XXIV:5(c).
136 Emphasis added. Annex, Transparency Decision, para. 2(a)(ii); see also, Transparency
Decision, para. 1(b) (‘Members parties . . . shall convey to the WTO . . . information on the
RTA, including . . . any foreseen timetable for its . . . provisional application . . . .’);
Transparency Decision, para. 7 (‘To assist Members in their consideration of a notified
FTA: (a) the parties shall make available to the WTO Secretariat data as specified in the
Annex . . . and (b) the WTO Secretariat . . . shall prepare a factual presentation of the RTA’).
137 See China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, Article 2 (‘The Parties agree to negotiate exped-
itiously in order to establish an ASEAN-China FTA within 10 years . . . .’).
138 Emphasis added. China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, Article 8.1.
139 See ibid. (‘ . . . 2010 for Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand, and by 2015 for the newer ASEAN Member States’).
140 ECFA, Articles 3.1 and 4.1.
141 From the US perspective, ‘an agreement that provided for open-ended negotiations that
‘‘might’’ result in additional elimination of tariffs could not constitute an agreement estab-
lishing or leading to the formation of an FTA.’ CRTA, Consideration of the Free Trade
Agreement between Pakistan and China, Goods, WT/REG237/M/1 (4 May 2009), at 4.
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Although not a single interim agreement that lacks a specific plan and sched-
ule has been found ‘invalid’ under WTO law, the Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 authorizes ‘the working
party’ to impose a plan and schedule that parties are required to follow.142
The working party is now the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements
(CRTA), which aims to examine FTAs/RTAs while considering systemic
issues.143 Thus, when reviewing the ECFA, the CRTA may find the
ECFA’s plan and schedule insufficient and consider imposing a more specific
one, although this is likely a hypothetical concern given continuing deadlock
in the CRTA over the approval of RTAs generally.
With respect to the ‘reasonable length of time’ requirement for FTAs, the
understanding stipulates that it ‘should exceed 10 years only in exceptional
cases’.144 To date, no WTO jurisprudence or report has defined what con-
stitutes ‘exceptional cases’. Moreover, it is common practice for FTAs’ tran-
sition periods to be extended to 12 years.145 For instance, under the
Australia-US FTA, the United States committed to eliminating its tariffs
on Australian beef after 18 years; and under the Korea–US FTA, Korea
included a 20-year phase-out period for its tariffs on US-produced Fuji
apples.146 The WTO has found none of these FTAs WTO-inconsistent. In
fact, neither Article XXIV of the GATT nor the Understanding would
render a FTA invalid simply because its transitional period exceeds 10
years. Therefore, the ECFA’s validity is unlikely to be affected by the ab-
sence of a defined transition period or by the fact that it may take longer
than 10 years to create the cross-straits FTA.
Also significant is the presence of certain ‘non-standard’ legal terminology
within the ECFA to allow Taiwan the flexibility to liberalize the coverage
of goods and services in subsequent negotiations. According to Article
XXIV:8(b) of the GATT, an FTA has to meet the ‘substantially all
the trade’ requirement with respect to trade in goods.147 The ECFA,
142 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 (Understanding), para. 10.
143 CRTA, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm (visited 20
October 2010).
144 Understanding, para. 3.
145 See Bartels, above note 130, at 346.
146 CRTA, Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Australia – Questions and
Replies, Revision, WT/REG184/5/Rev. 1 (1 September 2007), at 2–3; United States
Department of Agriculture: Foreign Agricultural Service, Fact Sheet: US-Korea Free
Trade Agreement – Benefits for Agriculture, September 2009, available at http://www.fas
.usda.gov/info/factsheets/korea.asp (visited 22 October 2010). With respect to interim agree-
ments between the European Union and African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the
EU believes that 15 year-liberalization should be ‘the benchmark for WTO compatibility’.
European Commission: Trade, Fact Sheet on the Interim Economic Partnership
Agreements: An Overview of the Interim Agreements, at 3.
147 GATT, Article XXIV:8(b)
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nonetheless, stipulates that tariffs and non-tariff barriers will be reduced or
eliminated on ‘a substantial majority of goods’ in bilateral trade.148
Furthermore, while an FTA that liberalizes trade in services has to satisfy
the ‘substantial sectoral coverage’ requirement under Article V:1(a) of the
GATS,149 the ECFA merely commits to reducing or eliminating discrimin-
atory measures ‘on a large number of sectors’.150 The fact that these terms in
the ECFA are different from those in the GATT and the GATS does not
‘authorize’ the cross-straits FTA to depart from WTO rules. The cross-straits
FTA, which may ‘exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases’, is required to
adhere to both ‘substantially all the trade’ and ‘substantial sectoral coverage’
requirements.
Regarding the ‘substantially all the trade’ requirement, the Appellate Body
in Turkey – Textiles only found the requirement to be ‘something considerably
more than merely some of the trade,’ but ‘not the same as all the trade’.151
Presently, WTO members lack consensus on the definition of this require-
ment and have proposed either a qualitative approach or a quantitative ap-
proach.152 The former means that no major sector can be excluded from the
FTA’s coverage, whereas the latter sets a certain percentage of the intra-FTA
parties trade as a statistical benchmark. Although this benchmark is ‘often
understood to mean liberalization of 90% of the trade in goods between the
FTA parties’,153 WTO members have not agreed on a specific percentage.
Nevertheless, WTO members have expressed ‘disappointment’ regarding the
China–Pakistan FTA because its first phase ‘would liberalize only about 35%
of tariff lines for both Parties’, which may not meet the ‘substantially all the
trade’ requirement.154 As the scale of liberalization under the EHP of the
ECFA is far lower than that of the China–Pakistan FTA, WTO members
may express similar concerns about the ECFA.
With regard to the ‘substantial sectoral coverage’ requirement under the
GATS, the footnote to Article V:1(a) of the GATS provides that this re-
quirement is to be ‘understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of
148 ECFA, Article 2.1.
149 GATS, Article V:1(a).
150 ECFA, Articles 2.2 and 4.2(1).
151 Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/
DS34/AB/R, adopted 19 November 1999, DSR 1999:VI, 2345, para. 48.
152 For detailed information on these two approaches, see CRTA, Synopsis of ‘Systemic’ Issues
Related to Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W/37 (2 March 2007), at 21.
153 European Commission-Trade, CARIFORUM-EC EPA: Trade in Goods, October 2008,
at 2.
154 See e.g., CRTA, Consideration of the Free Trade Agreement between Pakistan and China,
Goods, above note 141, at 3. With respect to the China-Pakistan FTA, ‘there was no plan
and schedule available for the completion of the FTA and [China and Pakistan] would
endeavor to reach consensus on a reasonable and relatively short period of time to form a
complete FTA’ and therefore the EU considered this agreement ‘an ‘‘imaginary’’ FTA’. Ibid.
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trade affected and modes of supply’.155 Furthermore, an FTA ‘should not
provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply’.156 The above
definitions reveal that although the GATS does not require liberalization of
all services sectors, the exclusion of major sectors may render the FTA
inconsistent with the ‘substantial sectoral coverage’ requirement.
Therefore, prospective Cross-Straits Agreements on Trade in Goods and
Trade in Services are required to comply with the GATT and GATS
requirements.
Under the above-mentioned FTA requirements, Taipei is most concerned
with the question of whether it may ‘legally’ prohibit Chinese labor from
entering Taiwan’s employment market and whether it can continue its
import ban on Chinese agricultural products. Regarding Chinese labor,
Taiwan’s prohibition does not relate to its specific services commitments
because the GATS does not ‘apply to measures affecting natural persons
seeking access to the employment market’ or measures concerning ‘employ-
ment on a permanent basis’.157 Thus, Taiwan is not obliged to open the
employment market under the ECFA. However, Taiwan’s prohibition of the
importation of 830 Chinese agricultural products after signing the ECFA
may jeopardize this policy’s adherence to the ‘substantially all the trade’
requirement of Article XXIV:8(b) of the GATT.158 Arguably, Taiwan’s
policy does not violate this requirement. Qualitatively speaking, agricultural
commodities are an insignificant percentage of cross-straits trade and thus
the exclusion of a non-major sector is justified. From a quantitative view,
830 Chinese agricultural products that are currently banned constitute only
7.5% of cross-straits trade, and even with this exclusion, the future
cross-straits FTA still meets the 90% benchmark.159 Given WTO members’
lack of consensus on FTA requirements and ‘enforcement’ procedures re-
garding WTO-inconsistent FTAs, the differences between a ‘model’ FTA
and the ECFA do not render it invalid. Nonetheless, these differences con-
stitute the ECFA’s unique ‘cross-straits characteristics’ and are expected to
be in the spotlight during the CRTA review sessions.
155 For further discussion on the ‘substantial sectoral coverage’ requirement, see Won-Mog
Choi, ‘Regional Economic Integration in East Asia: Prospect and Jurisprudence’, 6
Journal of International Economic Law 49 (2003), at 64–5.
156 GATS, Article V:1(a), footnote.
157 GATS, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement,
para. 2.
158 Liang An Jing Ji Xie Yi (ECFA) Wen Da Ji/830 Xiagn Zhong Guo Dai Lu Nong Chan Pin Jin
Kao Guan Zhi [ECFA Q&A/Prohibition on the Importation of 830 Chinese Agricultural
Products], available at http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=21312 (in Chinese) (visited
22 October 2010).
159 Ibid.
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D. The dispute settlement mechanism
Having discussed the ECFA’s consistency with WTO rules, it is important to
explore how the ECFA’s dispute settlement mechanism can safeguard trade
interests under the EHP and enable future agreements. The DSM under the
ECFA forms the prelude to the legalization of cross-straits economic rela-
tions. This mechanism is of importance because both China and Taiwan
have been hesitant to resort to the WTO for reasons identified previously.
The ECFA ensures that both sides will establish ‘appropriate dispute settle-
ment procedures’ and will conclude the Cross-Straits Agreement on Dispute
Settlement Mechanism (Agreement on DSM) within six months after the
ECFA takes effect.160 Before the Agreement on DSM takes effect, disputes
arising from the ECFA will be ‘resolved through consultations’ or by the
CSEC Committee.161
From 1990 to 2010, China and Taiwan concluded 22 agreements, eight of
which contain no dispute settlement provisions162 and 13 of which merely
provide that any disputes ‘shall be resolved by prompt negotiation’ without
enforcement procedures.163 The ECFA is thus the preliminary step for pla-
cing the politically volatile cross-straits economic relations under a legal
framework. Notwithstanding this significance, the ECFA’s dispute settlement
provisions fail to effectively safeguard trade interests for the EHP implemen-
tation. The ASEAN framework agreements provide three models for dispute
settlement mechanisms. First, both the China–ASEAN and India–ASEAN
Framework Agreements envision separate agreements on DSM within one
year.164 In the interim period, disputes arising from the agreements’ ‘inter-
pretation, implementation or application’ will be resolved by consultation.165
Second, the Japan–ASEAN Framework Agreement resembles the former
160 ECFA, Article 10.1.
161 Ibid., Article 10.2.
162 The list of 22 cross-straits agreements and their texts are available at http://www.sef.org
.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=4384&CtUnit=2569&BaseDSD=7&mp=300 (visited 20 October 2010).
The eight agreements that have no dispute settlement rules include: the 1990 Kinmen
Accord, the 1993 Joint Agreement of the Koo-Wong Talks, the 1993 Agreement on the
System for Contacts and Meeting between SEF and ARATS, the 1994 Facilitation
Measures for the Entry and Exit of SEF and ARATS Personnel, the 1995 Consensus of
the First Preparatory Meeting for the Second Koo-Wang Talks, the 1997 Summary Accord
of the Taiwan and Hong Kong Shipping Negotiations, the 2008 SEF-ARATS Minutes of
Talks on Cross-Straits Charter Flights, and the 2009 Cross-Straits Air Transport
Supplementary Agreement.
163 For example, Cross-Straits Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection and
Cooperation (Cross-Straits IPR Agreement), Article 15; Cross-Straits Joint Crime-Fighting
and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, Article 22.
164 China–ASEAN Framework Agreement, Article 11.1; Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (India–ASEAN Framework Agreement), Article 11.1.
165 See China–ASEAN Framework Agreement, Article 11.2 (‘[A]ny disputes . . . shall be settled
amicably by consultations and/or mediation’); India–ASEAN Framework Agreement, Article
11.2 (‘[A]ny disputes . . . shall be settled amicably by mutual consultations’).
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approach, but differs in that the DSM is incorporated into the final Japan–
ASEAN Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership, rather than
concluded in a separate agreement on DSM.166 Finally, the Korea–ASEAN
Framework Agreement was negotiated and took effect concurrently with the
Korea–ASEAN Agreement on DSM, which accords jurisdiction over dis-
putes arising from both the EHP under the Framework Agreement and
subsequent subject-specific agreements.167
The first two models bear substantial political risks and provide no legal
recourse to either party in the interim period before finalizing the formal
dispute settlement agreement. The ASEAN-Korea Framework Agreement
model would best serve the interests of China and Taiwan, particularly
given the EHP’s scale and the possibility of legal disputes arising under
the ECFA. However, the ECFA’s DSM is modeled after that of the
China–ASEAN and the India–ASEAN Framework Agreements primarily be-
cause concurrent negotiations for a dispute settlement agreement would
postpone the implementation of the EHP, which is essential to Taiwanese
industries. As the strong political will that expedited the negotiations also
undermines the ECFA’s legal stability, the governments should be cautious
about the potential dispute settlement issues identified below.
1. Jurisdictional problems of forum shopping
The future Cross-Straits Agreement on DSM will focus on claims between
parties, whereas the Cross-Straits Agreement on Investment (Agreement on
Investment) will deal with investor-state claims. As for the former, two po-
tential jurisdictional issues may surface. First, outside the ECFA structure,
certain cross-straits agreements concerning trade issues have their own dis-
pute settlement provisions.168 A respondent in a dispute concerning trade in
goods or services may assert that the Agreement on DSM lacks jurisdiction
because a complainant is obliged to resolve the dispute only by ‘consult-
ation’, as stipulated in other cross-straits agreements. The CAFTA would
not result in a similar jurisdictional impasse because China and ASEAN do
not have free-standing trade-related agreements that contain separate dispute
settlement mechanisms outside the CAFTA framework. Therefore, negoti-
ators should pay particular attention to addressing this loophole when
166 Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership between the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and Japan, Article 9.
167 See Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the
Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and
the Republic of Korea, Article 5.1 (‘[A]ny dispute concerning . . . this Framework Agreement
shall be resolved through the procedures and mechanism as set out in the Agreement on
Dispute Settlement Mechanism . . . .’). For the structure of the Korea–ASEAN FTA, see
Won-Mog Choi, ‘Legal Analysis of Korea-ASEAN Regional Trade Integration’, 41 (3)
Journal of World Trade 581 (2007), at 585.
168 Cross-Straits IPR Agreement, Article 15; Cross-Straits Arrangement on Cooperation of
Agricultural Product Quarantine and Inspection, Article 11.
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drafting the Agreement on DSM. An efficient way to tackle this issue is to
accord jurisdiction to the Agreement on DSM over trade disputes that arise
from all cross-straits agreements.
Second, the overlap of jurisdictions under the WTO and the Cross-Straits
Agreement on DSM may complicate cross-straits trade disputes. With the
exception of CEPAs, FTAs concluded by China and Taiwan have a similar
design to deter ‘forum shopping’. Once a complainant files a suit, the forum
it chooses ‘shall be used to the exclusion of’ the respondent.169 For example,
if Panama sued Taiwan under the Taiwan-Panama FTA, the FTA’s jurisdic-
tional clause would prohibit Taiwan from resorting to the WTO dispute
settlement system. The same rationale applies to a case initiated by
ASEAN against China under the CAFTA. This issue arose from an FTA’s
jurisdictional ‘exclusion clause’ that appeared in Mexico – Soft Drinks, in
which the United States brought a complaint against Mexico’s tax meas-
ures.170 Mexico requested that the panel and the Appellate Body decline
jurisdiction. Mexico argued that because the case constituted part of ‘a
broader dispute’ it had previously brought against the United States in
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) proceedings, the ‘exclu-
sion clause’ (i.e., Article 2005(6) of the NAFTA) mandated that the NAFTA
be the only forum for the dispute.171 Both the panel and the Appellate Body
disagreed with Mexico. In particular, the Appellate Body found that a WTO
panel did not possess ‘the authority to decline to rule on the entirety of the
claims’, and declining its own jurisdiction would ‘diminish’ a complaining
party’s right under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).172 In
addition, although there might be ‘legal impediments’ that exclude WTO
panels from hearing a case, the Appellate Body found that no such impedi-
ments existed in that case.173 As WTO jurisprudence provides limited guid-
ance on what would constitute ‘legal impediments’, jurisdictional issues
resulting from an FTA’s ‘exclusion clause’ can only be determined on a
169 For example, Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement
on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the People’s Republic of China, art. 2.6; Free Trade Agreement between the
Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Nicaragua, Article 22.03.3. For detailed
analyses of dispute settlement in China’s and Taiwan’s FTAs, see Francis Snyder, ‘China,
Regional Trade Agreements and WTO Law’, 43 (1) Journal of World Trade (2009), at
39–47; Factual Presentation: Free Trade Agreement between Nicaragua and the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Goods and Services), Report by
the Secretariat, WT/REG267/1, 16 July 2010, at 58–60.
170 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/
DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, DSR 2006:I, 3, para. 42. For discussions on the
exclusion clause, see Henry Gao and CL. Lim, ‘Saving the WTO from the Risks of
Irrelevance: The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a ‘‘Common Good’’ for RTA
Disputes’, 11 Journal of International Economic Law 899 (2008), at 907–11.
171 Ibid., paras 42 and 54.
172 Ibid., paras 46 and 48–53.
173 Ibid., para. 54.
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case-by-case basis.174 Thus, it is advisable that unlike their FTAs, China and
Taiwan should avoid the inclusion of such an exclusion clause in the
Agreement on DSM in order to prevent a jurisdictional battle that may
prolong the legal process.
2. Claims by private parties
In addition to above-mentioned inter-state arbitration, investor-state arbitra-
tion should be included in the Cross-Straits Agreement on Investment based
on the CAFTA model. This agreement, which is comparable to a bilateral
investment treaty (BIT), would provide an important investment protec-
tion mechanism for investors. China enacted the 1994 Law on the
Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots and the 1999 Rules for
the Implementation of this law.175 However, both statutes deem Taiwanese
investments to be ‘domestic investments’ and thus international arbitration is
inapplicable for relevant disputes. Furthermore, as Taiwan is not a party to
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), Taiwanese investors
cannot resort to the multilateral mechanism within the World Bank for
their investment disputes with the Chinese government.176 In practice, the
absence of legal recourse on the Mainland often makes Taiwanese enterprises
vulnerable to Chinese local governments’ land expropriation and frequent
changes in labor and environmental regulations. The incorporation of
investor-state arbitration into the ECFA framework will thus provide legal
protection to Taiwanese investors in China. Given the increasing numbers of
Chinese investors in Taiwan, this arbitration mechanism is also important in
safeguarding their business interests.
V. CONCLUSION
The Taiwan Strait was once depicted as East Asia’s Balkan region. Sovereign
disputes compounded by political animosity between China and Taiwan have
174 See Gabrielle Marceau and Julian Wyatt, ‘Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled:
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO’, 1 (1) Journal of International Dispute
Settlement 67 (2010), at 71 (‘There is little WTO jurisprudence even indirectly relevant
to the question of the applicability of non-WTO choice of forum clauses before WTO
adjudicatory bodies . . . .’).
175 The texts of the Law on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots and the Rules
for the Implementation of the Law on the Protection to Investment of Taiwan Compatriots
are available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-05-19/11513271540.shtml and http://news
.sina.com.cn/c/2004-05-19/11523271554.shtml (in Chinese) (visited 20 October 2010).
For private investment disputes, Taiwanese investors often resort to Taiwan Affairs Offices
at the local level, but the efficiency of this political mechanism varies largely between
provinces.
176 The PRC joined the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) in 1993. Under the Convention, the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes under the World Bank deals with
investor-state arbitration.
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prevented both sides from developing normal trade relations for decades.
This background signifies the ECFA’s unique status as the most important
cross-straits agreement to date. The agreement also represents the first FTA
concluded between WTO members with long-standing territorial conflicts.
This article examined geopolitical and legal issues that arise from the
ECFA with a focus on its relations vis-a`-vis East Asian regionalism and
WTO rules. It first analyzed why and how the Taiwan Strait became a con-
spicuous WTO-inconsistent area as a result of China’s and Taiwan’s
cross-straits policies. While the domino effect of proliferating Asian FTAs
and changing cross-strait politics led to the ECFA, the agreement now prom-
ises to transform bilateral trade ties and further escalate regional integration.
The article further explored the ECFA’s application of the model provided
by ASEAN’s framework agreements and its consistency with WTO require-
ments as an FTA interim agreement. The article found that given limited
jurisprudence and WTO members’ lack of consensus on such requirements,
the ECFA’s particular cross-strait characteristics may present obstacles to
normal trade relations. Nonetheless, the ECFA represents a significant step
toward the legalization of politically volatile bilateral trade and constitutes an
indispensible building block for prospective cross-straits economic integra-
tion. Moving forward, the article cautioned that the prevention of forum
shopping and the creation of an investor-state arbitration mechanism as im-
portant subjects for negotiation in the post-ECFA era.
The conclusion of the ECFA marks a milestone both in cross-Taiwan
Strait relations and in WTO history. The ECFA may have been inconceiv-
able absent strong political will, but the WTO legal framework was crucial in
making this ‘mission impossible’ possible. While the ECFA’s impact on
cross-straits ties and East Asian regionalism remains to be seen, this agree-
ment provides an important gateway to regional stability and presents a
valuable example of bilateral trade liberalization with the broad framework
of the multilateral trading system.
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